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Abstract
This paper explores the economic developments in colonial Virginia between 1622 and 1646 and
argues that various economic developments within colonial Virginia pushed the colony toward
greater integration with the larger Atlantic economy and that these developments altered the
nature of trade between the English colonists and the Powhatan in such a way that formal
separation per the 1646 treaty was an attractive option to both parties. During this time frame,
which encompassed both the Second and Third Anglo-Powhatan Wars, economic interactions
between the English colonists and the Powhatan chiefdom became less frequent and focused
largely on small-scale exchange of high-value goods. The treaty ending the Third AngloPowhatan War in 1646 formalized the growing divide between the English colony and the
Powhatan chiefdom by establishing clear geographic boundaries and restricting trade to two
border forts. Although both the Second and Third Anglo-Powhatan Wars began with a large
massacre of English colonists by the Powhatan, followed by violent reprisals from the English,
the former dragged on for ten years and ended without serious reorganization of the political
situation. The latter conflict was over within two years and resulted in the formal separation of
the two societies. It was the economic developments that occurred throughout this period that
led to the vastly different outcomes for these two conflicts that began in such similar fashion.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
In 1646, the General Assembly of the Virginia Colony enacted a treaty with
Necotowance, the ostensible leader of the Powhatan people following the death of
Opechancanough, which specified boundaries between English and Powhatan territory. 1 This
treaty represented not only the official end of the Third Anglo-Powhatan War, but also
formalized what had been an ongoing trend toward diminished cross-cultural interaction between
English colonists and the Powhatan. It also coincided with the end of the Powhatan chiefdom as
a meaningful political entity, its political structures having been damaged by long-term economic
developments and the military losses of the Third Anglo-Powhatan War.2 Powhatan leadership
can thus be seen as attempting to repair some of this damage in the terms of the treaty.
Though it is frequently given brief mention as being an important point in Virginia
history, the treaty itself has not been the object of any intensive study. Anthropologist Helen
Rountree has probably given the treaty as thorough a treatment as anyone. However, Rountree’s
focus was limited to a brief overview of the treaty terms and a discussion of how the English
never actually intended to uphold the northern boundary that they establish at the York River.
Referencing an act passed later in the same Assembly session as the treaty, Rountree wrote, “we

Note on use of “Powhatan” and “Indian”: I am predominantly examining the relationship between the Powhatan
Indians and the English. For purposes of larger economic analysis, and a lack of specificity in many sources (which
often, though not always, use nothing more specific than “Indians” or “Savage”), “Powhatan” in this context will
refer to the larger Powhatan Paramount Chiefdom/Confederacy, rather than the specific tribe of the same name.
When other tribes are mentioned specifically, I have tried to explain briefly the relationship between this tribe, the
Powhatan, and the English.
2
John Salmon. "Tsenacomoco (Powhatan Paramount Chiefdom)." Encyclopedia Virginia. Virginia Foundation for
the Humanities, last edited May 30, 2014, accessed March 6, 2016
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Tsenacomoco_Powhatan_Paramount_Chiefdom#its7.
1
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can conclude only that the settlement law was, in effect, an agreement among the English that
they would move northward again when Indian rancor over the recent war had diminished, and
that any protests made later by the nonliterate Powhatans would be pushed aside.”3

Boundaries of the 1646 Treaty

Map 1.1.4

Helen Rountree, Pocahantas’s People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia through Four Centuries (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 88.
4
Charles Grymes, “Key Treaties Defining the Boundaries Separating English and Native American Territories,”
Virginia Places accessed March 6, 2016, http://virginiaplaces.org/settleland/treaties.html.
3
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Another anthropologist, Frederic Gleach, recognized the 1646 treaty as a major turning
point in Anglo-Powhatan relations. However, Gleach did not imply that the treaty had any
economic significance, instead attributing the Powhatan’s agreement to the terms as being due to
“the effects of disease, warfare, and the appropriation of their lands.”5 The treaty has thus been
viewed by those who have examined it as uniquely beneficial to the English colonists and
exploitative of the Powhatan. This is in line with much historical literature on political
agreements between Europeans and American Indians, but such an interpretation strips Indian
actors of agency and ignores the complexities of the relationships that led to such agreements.
It does not appear that anyone has explored the idea that the treaty represented an
economic agreement. But, by applying an economic analysis to the patterns of exchange and
production in the Chesapeake economy around the time of the 1646 Anglo-Powhatan treaty, the
terms of the treaty appear to have made economic sense to both the English and the Powhatan.
Such an analysis moves the historical understanding of the treaty beyond the obvious political
and military considerations that led to its creation. Looking beyond this work, an economic
analysis of this period can provide insight into the larger economic developments that ultimately
led to English domination of the Chesapeake region by the late seventeenth century.
In the second chapter, I argue that the 1646 treaty, while certainly a reaction to violent
conflict, was also strongly influenced by the economic developments that occurred between 1622
and 1646. Although the 1621/2 massacre of Virginia colonists by the Powhatan strained

Frederic Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1997), 183.
5
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relations between the groups, it did not completely sever their economic ties.6 The economic
development of Virginia between 1622 and 1646 significantly affected the relationship between
the English colony and the Powhatan polity, irrespective of the Second and Third AngloPowhatan wars. Viewed in the context of these economic developments, the clear boundary and
limitations on trade and travel established by the 1646 treaty ending the Third Anglo-Powhatan
represented an advantageous agreement for both Virginia and the Powhatans in that a clear
boundary provided some semblance of territorial and political stability. By 1646, neither group
had compelling economic reasons to maintain extensive trade with the other as Virginia was able
to develop its grain production beyond self-sufficiency and the exchange of high-value goods
was carried out at a low volume, and the Powhatan were interested only in consumer goods that
provided useful substitutes for items that already fit with their cultural preferences. This
selectivity on the part of the Powhatan illustrates a high level of agency and awareness of larger
economic and cultural contexts.
To continue with the idea of agency, Frederick Fausz argued that historians largely
ignored the First Anglo-Powhatan War (1609-1614) and that the resulting ambiguous truce
“prevented a rational, bilateral consensus on either the causes or effects of that … war.”7 The
relevance of Fausz’s argument actually extends further temporally and I argue that it was not
until the end of the Third Anglo-Powhatan War in 1646 that the two sides fully appreciated what

6

Note on Dates: English records prior to September 14, 1752 were dated according to the Julian calendar, which
recognized 25 March as the first day of a new year. Events occurring between 1 January and 24 March are thus
given with two years listed (i.e. 1633/4), with the former being the year of the event per the Julian calendar, and the
latter being the year corrected to fit the Gregorian calendar.
J. Frederick Fausz, “An Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides”: England’s First Indian War, 1609-1614,” The
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 98 (1990): 50.
7
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caused conflict between them and reached a rational, bilateral consensus on not only the causes
of conflict, but how to mitigate them in a potentially lasting manner.
In 1646, neither side was in a position to simply impose its preferred solution, and the
factors that caused conflict were political, cultural, economic, and social. These factors caused
division within English and Powhatan societies, not simply between them. Rather than viewing
the English colonists and the Powhatan as two opposed entities, one must see them as dynamic
societies dealing with each other while also dealing with their own internal issues. The
economic and demographic changes that occurred within just a few decades meant that the
context in which the English colonists and the Powhatan hammered out a formal treaty in 1646
was vastly different from that in which they muddled to a truce in 1614. They were arguably not
even the same societies. I attempt to show how and why these changes occurred in order to
demonstrate why the terms that constituted an acceptable agreement changed.
Such a view is useful not only to the present study, but must also be considered whenever
one is examining cross-cultural relationships. As a brief point of comparison, the Pequot War
(1636-38) in New England and Kieft’s War (c.1640-1645) in New Netherland both ended with
the near-obliteration of the colonists’ indigenous rivals, and created lingering negative
consequences, politically, economically, and psychologically.8 The relatively peaceful
resolution to conflict in Virginia in 1646 demonstrates that colonial contexts were unique and
events were driven by local circumstances.

8

Katherine J. Grandjean, “The Long Wake of the Pequot War,” Early American Studies 9 (2011): 379-411.

10
Along with a fixed geographic boundary, the treaty laid out restrictions on cross-cultural
interaction and several forts were designated as the only authorized entry and exit points for
those wishing to cross the boundary. These restrictions were obviously an effort to establish clear
jurisdictional boundaries for the Virginia colony, as they restricted the movement of people and
goods to only those who had the sanction of the colonial authorities. While the terms implied a
decreased reliance on cross-cultural trade for both parties, they also demonstrated that some trade
and political interaction was still desirable, so long as the authorities on either side regulated it.

Forts in Virginia, 1646
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Map from Charles Grymes, “Frontier Forts in Virginia,” Virginia Places accessed March 6, 2016,
http://virginiaplaces.org/military/frontierforts.html.
9
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Chapter three explores the demographics of the region, how these changed over time, and
how these changes were influenced by economic circumstances. In the two decades preceding
the treaty, Virginia’s English population increased vastly and the colony became more involved
in the wider Atlantic markets. Both factors led to internal economic developments in Virginia
that displaced indigenous actors in many colonial economic roles. However, displacement of
certain indigenous economic roles did not mean a complete end to Anglo-Powhatan economic
interaction. Rather, the nature of cross-cultural exchange adjusted to meet changing economic
circumstances. If the closure of all economic interaction had been the goal of the treaty, then it
would not have included provisions specifying rules under which trade would yet be allowed.10
When examining the treaty, one must treat the terms as more or less genuine (at least at the time
of their writing). Had the treaty been merely a sop, it would not have included provisions for
enforcing rules against English colonists trespassing on what was designated Powhatan land.11
This was not a provision to prevent runaway servants escaping (which was addressed separately),
but a ban on conducting unauthorized activity in the Powhatan domain.
In chapter four, I argue that the massacre of 1621/2 represents a logical starting point for
the evaluation of Virginia’s economic development, both due to the massive demographic impact
of the event, and the shift in the archaeological record around this time that indicates an
alteration of patterns of exchange between the Powhatan and the English colonists. While

10

William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First
Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619 (New York: R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823), Vol. I, 324-326. See articles
3, 7, 8, and 11.
11
Ibid, 325. Article 4 of the treaty reads “That in case any English shall repaire contrary to the articles agreed vpon,
to the said north side of Yorke river, such person soe offending, being lawfully convicted, be adjudged as felons.”
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violence was a fact of colonial life and shaped perceptions and interactions, it cannot be the sole
lens through which colonial history is examined.12
In chapter five, I attempt to reconstruct some major economic developments within
Virginia to demonstrate the colony’s increasing focus on the broader Atlantic marketplace and
increased ability to provide its own sustenance. I argue that these developments reduced the
need for sustained interaction between the colony and the Powhatan chiefdom. In chapter six, I
explore the markets for various goods that were exchanged between the English colonists and the
Powhatan and conclude that by the time of the 1646 treaty, only high-value goods were being
exchanged between the two groups, and thus the restrictions imposed by the treaty did not
represent any significant economic loss. This made the benefits of the treaty all the more
attractive since they came with small opportunity costs.
Taken in total, the evidence here examined leads to two conclusions, one general to the
period, and the other specific to the treaty. First, both the English colonists and the Powhatans
were behaving in an economically rationale manner. That is, all the actors here involved
recognized what their interests were and acted in a manner consistent with maximizing their
utility. Second, and stemming from the previous point, the treaty in 1646 was negotiated in good
faith. That is, the treaty genuinely represented what both parties believed to be a legitimate and
binding agreement. Post-treaty developments should not be read as evidence that the treaty itself
was never intended to be legitimate.

12

See Bernard Bailyn, The Barbarous Years (New York: Vintage, 2013) for fuller examination of violence in
colonial North America.
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Written records describing cross-cultural interactions between the English and Powhatan
are rare for the period between the 1622 massacre and the treaty of 1646. This seems to be in
part due to the increased mutual suspicion and hostility simply limiting such interactions.
However, there is evidence that such exchanges did continue to occur, even during time of war.
If the statutes passed by the Virginia Assembly were largely reactionary to local circumstances,
rather than preemptive – and the previously discussed evidence seems to support this view – then
these statutes might provide evidence for the types of interactions that were occurring between
English and Powhatan individuals by way of the actions that they sought to ban or regulate.
To this end, Walter Hening’s collection of Virginia’s extant legislative records has
proved invaluable.13 Susan Kingsbury’s collection of records from the Virginia Company, Susie
Ames’ collection of court records from Accomack/Northampton County, H.R. McIlwaine’s
edited collection of Council minutes and Warren Billings’ documentary history of Virginia
provided useful primary source material, as well.14 However, the availability of source material
for much of the period, and especially the 1630s, is quite limited.
County court records provide wonderful fine-grained details of life in the colony, but
many county record collections in eastern Virginia were destroyed during the U.S. Civil War, or

13

William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First
Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619 (New York: R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823).
14
See Susan Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 1606-1626 (Washington D.C.:
Government Press Office, 1906-35).
See Susie M. Ames, ed., County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia, 1640-1645 (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1973).
See H.R. McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-1632, 1670-1676
(Richmond: Virginia State Library Board, 1924).
See Warren M. Billings, The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 16061689 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975).
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in other building-damaging events.15 Further, the Virginia Company records end in 1626, the
Company having been dissolved in 1624. McIlwaine’s minutes cover the period of 1622-1632,
but do not pick up again until 1670. The statutes are sparse throughout much of the 1620s and
none appear to exist after 1633 and before 1639. Some correspondence is available from the
1630s, especially letters between the Privy Council in London, Governor John Harvey, and
Virginia planters, but economic information is limited, as these are largely focused on the
political struggles that Harvey faced.16
One reason that the treaty and the period more generally have received little attention is
probably the paucity of source material, especially with regard to quantitative data. There are
certain questions that simply cannot be answered by the existing source material. Hard numbers
are rare and much of the economic data must be inferred from clues and key phrases in the
documents. However, by aggregating what references are available, I was able to uncover some
general economic trends during a period that has otherwise been unexamined from an economic
perspective. These economic trends help to explain political decisions and reiterate the
importance of avoiding monocausal explanations. I stress the point that an economic
interpretation of the 1646 Anglo-Powhatan treaty does not replace any military, political, or
cultural interpretations, but rather draws on and informs these other perspectives. At the very
least, an economic interpretation such as this sheds light on a dimly lit period, especially when
contrasted with the massive amount of scholarship on the earliest years of the Virginia colony,

For a complete list of the damaged collections, see “Lost Records Localities” document available via the Library
of Virginia at https://www.lva.virginia.gov/
16
See “Virginia in 1632-33-34.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 8 (1900): 147-161.
See “Virginia in 1636. The Administration of Wast and Return of Harvey,” The Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography 8 (1901): 34-43.
15

15
and the period following the English Civil War (c.1650 on). I also hope that this interpretation
offers a challenge to those who would rely on anachronistic and overly-general invocations of
racism or colonialism (in a pejorative, purely exploitative sense) to explain developments in this
period. The evidence instead supports the idea that individual actors, English, Powhatan, and
otherwise, tended to make rational decisions and possessed a degree agency in pursuing their
goals. The constraints on agency that these individuals did face were just as likely to be selfimposed due to culturally-driven preferences as they were to come from external authorities.
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Chapter II. THE 1646 TREATY AS AN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT
The concerns related to cross-cultural violence in the Chesapeake region cannot be
overlooked in any interpretation of the treaty. During both the 1622 and 1644 massacres, it was
the relative freedom of cross-cultural movement and interaction that made carrying out the
massacres possible. By 1644, some restrictions on interactions were in place, but no clear,
enforceable boundaries existed. This fact was almost certainly instrumental in the tightened
Anglo-Powhatan trade restrictions set out in the 1646 treaty. However, the terms of the 1646
treaty should not be read only as an effort to prevent violence; they also reflected the changing
economic realities in the Chesapeake region.
The treaty can thus also be understood as an economic agreement between the English
and Powhatan. If one views the 1646 agreement through the economic lens of a utility
possibilities frontier, the terms of the agreement represent a Pareto efficient point in terms of the
utility derived by each party. That is, given the economic situation in 1646, it was not possible
to improve the treaty terms with regard to the economic utility of one party without making the
terms worse for the other. Simply put, a formal political and geographic division with limited
allowance for trade and diplomacy was the best deal that either side could hope for.
The idea of regulating trade and granting privileged status or monopoly rights to
companies or countries was standard practice at this time. The Virginia Company of London
was granted an exclusive charter to found the Jamestown colony in 1606, and while the
Company did not survive, the practice of regulating and licensing trade carried on in the colony.
In 1600, Queen Elizabeth I granted a charter to the East India Company, giving it exclusive
rights to trade in the Far East. In 1604, the English government agreed the Treaty of London
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with Spain, which ended the Anglo-Spanish War and granted Spain trading privileges in the
English Channel, access to certain ports, and also contained English promises to cut off trade
with Dutch rebels.17 King James I renewed and expanded the charter of the Levant Company in
1605, and in 1613, he granted a whaling monopoly around the island of Spitsbergen to the
Muscovy Company.18 The practice of regulating trade via formal procedures and specified
locations that occurred in Virginia were entirely in line with broader trends in English economic
thought and diplomacy. Free from corporate oversight, the government of Virginia was
essentially acting like a miniature version on the government in London.
Economic and political agreements did have to reflect reality, rather than the whims of
the political authorities, if they were to be sustainable. In 1622, and still by 1632, both the
English and Powhatan could not conceive of a resolution to violent conflict that resulted in a
nearly complete separation of their polities and societies. In contrast to the suddenness of the
massacre and reprisal, the level of economic integration that had existed prior to 1622
disappeared slowly. Over time, the changes in Virginia between the 1621/2 massacre and the
1646 treaty worked to disintegrate the Anglo-Powhatan economy to a point where the benefits both politically and territorially - of a clear boundary greatly outweighed the economic costs of
any lost trade due to formal disintegration. The trade that was occurring at this point was largely
limited to high-value goods, the exchange of which would not have been greatly disrupted by the
treaty regulations.

17

For text of this treaty, see S.W. A General Collection of Treatys (London: J.J. and P. Knapton, 1732).
Esther C. Mohr, “The Development of the Fisheries under the Reign of James I, and Their Effect upon American
Civilization” (Unpublished thesis, University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1910), 23.
Mortimer Epstein, The Early History of the Levant Company (London: G. Routledge, 1908), 67.
18

18
Such a view requires an understanding of the shifts in the Virginia economy that took
place over the preceding two and one half decades. In March 1621/2 the Powhatan massacred a
substantial portion of the English population. The subsequent war lasted ten years, but did not
lead to the establishment of any clear boundaries between the two peoples. In 1644, the
Powhatan again massacred a substantial portion of the English population, but the resulting war
lasted barely two years and ended with a clearly defined and strictly enforced boundary. The
similarities in how each war started make the differences in how each played out revealing. It
was not the wars that changed the nature of the economy, but the economic developments that
changed the impacts of the respective wars.
Several pieces of evidence support the idea that the 1646 treaty marked an important shift
in patterns of cross-cultural exchange and patterns of production. First, as historian James
Bradley has pointed out in his article on colonial wampum trade and production, beads produced
in the Chesapeake quite abruptly reappear in the archaeological record at more northern sites in
1646.19 This implies either a reestablishment of previously disrupted indigenous trade networks,
or at least a change to pre-1646 exchange patterns, which could plausibly have been a response
to the restrictions on interaction with the English colonists in Virginia. However, it seems
unlikely that production of shell beads and long-range trade could have picked up so quickly.
The reappearance of Chesapeake shell beads in other locations around 1646 was more likely the
culmination of a shift that began at some earlier point, perhaps in 1644 at the start of the Third
Anglo-Powhatan War, or even earlier.

James Bradley, “Re-visiting Wampum and other Seventeenth-Century Shell Games,” Archaeology of Eastern
North America 39 (2011): 34.
19
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Second, the proportion of locally-made tobacco pipes found at various English
archaeological sites in the Chesapeake region drops noticeably around roughly 1650, and
becomes negligible after 1670.20 The drop in local production by English colonists around 1650
implies that something happened around this time that made importation of European-made
pipes more attractive to the Virginia colonists. The archeological evidence indicated that several
Indian groups did utilize European-made tobacco pipes, so it is entirely plausible that the
Powhatan also constituted part of the market for locally-made pipes.21 When taken together with
the increased opportunity costs of local pipe production, the restrictions on cross-cultural
exchange per the treaty could reflect the shift away from local production and the decreased
marginal benefits of exchanging these goods. If this pattern held for local production of other
consumer goods, this would support the idea that hopes of diversification (though prominently
advocated) were largely misplaced. Further, this pattern would support the conclusion that the
treaty restrictions were in part the result of increased competition for consumer goods between
the English and Powhatan.
Third, the appointment of William Berkeley as governor of Virginia in 1641 coincided
with a stated, if not implemented, policy of agricultural diversification.22 Tobacco production
had expanded steadily since the 1610s, and continued to be the predominant crop in Virginia
long beyond 1646, so true diversification of the Virginia economy was never realized. However,
the idea of pursuing more varied agricultural production almost certainly influenced the Virginia

C. Jane Cox, Al Luckenbach, Dave Gadsby, with contribution by Shawn Sharpe, “Locally-made Tobacco Pipes in
the Colonial Chesapeake” (paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Society for Historical Archaeology,
York, England).
21
Ibid. See discussion of Camden and Posey sites.
22
See Warren M. Billings, “Sir William Berkeley and the Diversification of the Virginia Economy,” The Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography 104 (1996): 439-440.
20
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Governor’s thoughts about the value of continued trade with the neighboring Indian tribes at the
time of the treaty.
Finally, the start of the English Civil War in the early 1640s greatly increased the
Virginia tobacco trade with the Dutch, which brought more income and trade goods to
Virginia.23 All of these developments helped to create a situation wherein English trade with
indigenous peoples became generally less frequent and less important, and increasingly focused
on fewer items. These economic factors, when combined with the legitimate concerns about
cross-cultural violence and clear boundaries of English jurisdiction, help to explain why the 1646
Anglo-Powhatan treaty laid out such stringent controls on cross-cultural interactions.
Changing Patterns of Governance
The clarification of the boundaries of English jurisdiction in the 1646 treaty was
particularly important to the colonial authorities with regard to controlling the movement of
people and goods. The colonial authorities had been trying to exert increased control over such
movement for over a decade prior to the treaty, but the agreement to end the conflict meant that
the colonial authorities could effectively enlist the Powhatan in policing the newly created
border. The territory that fell under English control per the treaty was effectively already under
English control prior to the Third Anglo-Powhatan War, and the English actually agreed to
withdraw settlers from north of the York River, so the Powhatan were not ceding any of their
currently occupied land and were gaining a mutually enforceable boundary. The Powhatan, in
agreeing to the boundary in the treaty, were sacrificing freedom of movement within their former

See John Pagan, “Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,” The Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography 90 (1982): 485-501.
23
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territory of English Virginia in exchange for a clear boundary that, presumably via English
enforcement, they hoped would help to maintain their existing territory.
In Article Six of the treaty, the Assembly made it a felony punishable by death for any
English to “entertain … or doe conceale any Indian or Indians that shall come within the said
limits.”24 In Article Nine, it was required that Necotowance return to the English any prisoners,
negroes, and guns that were still in possession of the Powhatan, as well as all Indian servants
who might flee to Powhatan territory in the future.25
In Articles Seven and Eight, the treaty specified that all trading between the Powhatan
and the English be conducted at either Fort Royal or Fort Henry.26 In order for any Powhatan to
enter English territory, it was required for them to obtain a special badge and shirt from one of
the two specified forts. Only sanctioned traders or messengers between Powhatan leaders and
the Governor of Virginia were granted these tokens of safe passage. Any Indians found in
Virginia without the requisite badges or shirt could be killed without legal penalty.27 Such an
agreement reduced the opportunities for exchange among independent actors, while increasing
the benefits for those actors best able to obtain official sanction, English or Powhatan, for
engaging in economic exchange. This arrangement further reduced the potential for violent
interactions, as well.
In this sense, the boundaries and restrictions established by the treaty represented a move
toward controlled economic exchange that both English and Powhatan authorities would have

24

Hening, Vol. I, 325.
Ibid, 325-6.
26
Ibid. See footnote 8 for map with locations of these forts.
27
Ibid, 324-5. See Article 3 of treaty.
25
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preferred to a free-flow of goods. That is, a regulated boundary meant that economic control
rested with those who controlled the border. In this view, the Powhatan leadership can be seen
as having used the treaty to consolidate their political control via constrained movement of
people and goods.
Increasing Governmental Authority in Virginia
Virginia became a royal colony in 1624 when King James I dissolved the Virginia
Company. However, Virginia’s implied right to self-government was not formally addressed,
the House of Burgesses continued to meet and legislate, and the Company governor was simply
replaced by a royal appointee.28 In keeping with the prevailing mercantilist economic policies of
the period, the government of Virginia regulated trade quite strictly and required traders to obtain
licenses. Thus, the economic aspects of the 1646 treaty should be seen in part as benefitting the
political patrons of traders, as well as the traders themselves.
In 1634, the colony of Virginia was divided into eight shires, “governed as the shires in
England…And Lieuten’ts to be appointed the same as in England, and in a more especial manner
to take care of the warr against Indians.”29 From 29 April 1635, there was an explanation “that
during the vacancy of the Governor, the Secretary should sign commissions, and passes, and
manage the affairs of the Indians."30 The references are quite brief, but the pattern of governance
was one that placed military logistics largely in the hands of local authority while keeping
economic matters under the authority of the governor’s office.
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In January 1639/40, the Assembly passed an act regulating the purchase of corn from
neighboring colonies or Indians, and also repealed a 1637 act that made bartering with Indians a
felony. The latter was replaced by a ban on trading for arms and ammunition, and left
punishment for trading in other commodities to the “discretion of the Governor and Council.”31
Again, these statutes are probably evidence that such trade occurred between Indians and English
colonists, though to what extent the prohibitions of trading weaponry were a response to actual
trade as opposed to (a perhaps understandable) paranoia is not clear. The power of the colonial
government to regulate trade was here again asserted and the implication of leaving decisions on
licenses to trade with the Governor and Council supports the idea that it was politically
connected traders who stood to benefit from any continued cross-cultural exchange. All of this
was consistent with the more general trend toward mercantilism in the seventeenth century,
wherein merchants received government protection and support.
Governor Berkeley’s instructions upon his appointment in 1641 included an article that
forbade any Virginian from receiving into his home, conversing with, or trading with the Indians
without special license.32 This particular prohibition is of interest for two reasons. First, it was
issued by the government in London, not the Assembly in Virginia. The fact that it was issued to
Berkeley, who was a proponent of diversifying the Virginia economy for the sake of selfsufficiency and who recognized that strict controls were essential to fulfilling this goal, was
unlikely to have been a coincidence. Second, it did allow trade via license from the proper
authority. While regulation of trade had been a feature of colonial government since 1607, the
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formal regulation of all trade with the Indians at this time seemed to deliberately coincide with
the arrival of a regime committed to diversification consistent with emerging mercantile ideas.
Such restrictions effectively left economic power with the colonial government and
traders who could receive its blessing. It was rare to find traders who lacked explicit connections
to the colonial government. At the same time, planters who were interested in producing tobacco
for export, though they required government sanction to trade (legally, at least), would not have
been much interested in cross-cultural exchange with the Powhatan by 1646, as they needed
buyers for their tobacco. Indentured laborers would not have had the material means nor
freedom of movement to carry on sustained profitable trade, even if they were allowed to try.
In April 1642, the Assembly issued a remonstrance to articulate its accomplishments to
date to the colonists. The seventh item on the list was “the setling of peace and friendship with
the Indians by mutual capitulation.”33 While it is tempting to interpret the phrase “mutual
capitulation” as a platitude to cover up English exploitation of the Powhatan, such a reading
would here be cynical. Given the inability of the English to consistently carry on the war and the
almost immediate restoration of official Anglo-Powhatan trade at the war’s end in 1632, it
appeared that both sides did genuinely benefit from ending formal hostilities. Those desiring to
engage in legally sanctioned trade were again able to do so. Even those colonists who were not
trading with the Powhatan still received peace (both politically and of mind).
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Powhatan Political Structure
Though the Powhatan polity has been historically referred to as a confederacy, some have
challenged the use of the term, claiming instead that “complex chiefdom” is a more accurate
description. Debra Gold explored the semantics and explained that “a confederacy is voluntary
and limited in scope… Complex chiefdoms and states by definition include strict economic
control on the part of the authority system and so supersede confederacies.”34 Hence, the
Powhatan polity that the English encountered in 1607 was really a complex chiefdom dominated
by the eponymous Powhatan.
By 1646, the Powhatan polity could probably be more accurately described as a
confederacy, as English settlement physically divided member tribes. The development over
time of the Powhatan polity from a tightly regulated complex chiefdom to a looser confederacy
was the opposite of the development in English Virginia. Although, even after 1646, the
Powhatan were never reduced to a position of dependency comparable to that of the original
Jamestown colonists, they did lose their ability to dictate the terms of their relationship with the
English colony. Virginia, especially after the arrival of Governor William Berkeley in 1641,
moved rapidly toward a model of tight governmental control of economic affairs. These models
of governmental organization and control over economic affairs are instructive in interpreting the
terms of the 1646 treaty.
By this time, the Powhatan political structure had been seriously undermined by the loss
of land to English settlement and by the devaluation of goods traditionally associated with
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political and spiritual power. The treaty recognized Necotowance as the overall leader of the
Powhatan, and while in many cases of negotiating treaties with indigenous peoples colonial
powers found it expedient to recognize a single political leader, it is useful to consider how the
Powhatan leader was able to use the agreement with the English to maintain a higher level of
control. By nominally taking the role of paramount leader in the treaty negotiation,
Necotowance could claim credit for any benefits the terms provided. Also, the boundaries laid
out in the treaty would be largely enforced by the English, but would benefit the Powhatan
leadership by providing tighter control over the movement of people and goods.
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Chapter III. LABOR AND DEMOGRAPHICS
Populations
The population of the Powhatan confederacy at the time of English settlement is not
known, though anthropologist Helen Rountree, who has studied the Powhatan extensively,
estimated it to be around 15,000. Historian James Rice has estimate that the total indigenous
population of the Chesapeake region at the time was just over 30,000.35 Despite the uncertainty
over the exact numbers, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Powhatan polity represented
roughly half of the indigenous population in the Chesapeake region, and was the primary
indigenous population with whom the English in Virginia interacted.
The non-indigenous population of Virginia was recorded at 350 in 1610, and had grown
to about 18,700 by 1650. The total non-indigenous population of the Chesapeake in 1650 was
roughly 23,200 when the 4,500 residents of Maryland are included.36 Given this colonial
population growth and without accurate numbers on the indigenous population, the populations
of English Virginia and the Powhatan confederacy were probably close to equal, with the former
being slightly larger right around the mid-1640s. Hence, one should resist any interpretation of
the 1646 treaty as the dictate of some sweeping demographic force. Real diplomacy was still
necessary at this time.
As a final note on the population, there were only 405 people of African origin in
Virginia by 1650 and another 300 in Maryland, representing 2.2 percent and 6.7 percent of the
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populations of their respectively colonies.37 Thus, any consideration of labor at this time cannot
rely on the idea that African slaves represented a ready substitute for Indian labor.38 Instead,
indentured labor filled this role. The resistance to an integrated Anglo-Powhatan labor force was
both a cultural and practical issue.
Indentured Labor
Indentured servitude was a feature of the Virginian economy from its earliest days, but it
was not until the session of March 1642/3 that the Assembly addressed the practice in meticulous
detail.39 In these statutes, the Assembly covered such behavior as servants marrying in secret,
running away to live with Indians or to work for another planter, arriving in Virginia without
indenture, and disregarding the Sabbath. Masters were also admonished to observe and uphold
the terms of indenture.40
Taken together, these statutes represent an official effort to commoditize indentured
labor. Though indentures were typically for set periods of time, it was expected that this time
would be maximally filled with productive work. Potential laboring time lost due to personal
matters or attempts to escape had to be repaid. It is perhaps notable that such statutes appeared
not long after the arrival of William Berkeley as governor. Though Berkeley strongly favored
diversification, he also recognized the need for the requisite human capital to sustain a diverse
economy. Unskilled, indentured labor possessed little in terms of knowledge or ability to
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perform specialized trades. The massive influx of labor thus did little to improve the level of
human capital in the colony.
In A Discourse and View of Virginia, published in 1663, Berkeley reflected on the state
of the colony in between his two terms as its governor. Though writing two decades after these
statutes were initially passed, Berkeley’s observations appear to be applicable to much of what
he experienced during his first term in office and offered some hints as to why he might have
favored more stringent controls on the behavior of indentured servants. First praising the upperclass of planters as “men of as good Families as any Subjects in England,” Berkeley then
acknowledged “that there is with us a great scarcity of good men; that is, of able Workmen…for
onely such servants as have been brought up to no Art of Trade, hunger and fear of prisons bring
to us.”41
It seems that with regard to the servants coming to Virginia, the change was only one of
quantity, not quality. In order to keep the economy functioning, the colony had to proscribe the
behavior and terms of employment for indentured servants. The Assembly attempted to achieve
this by commodifying indentured labor so as to afford the owners of this labor some semblance
of property rights. Unskilled indentures thus did not constitute a workforce with which Virginia
could successfully diversify its production of goods along the lines Berkeley imagined.
Indentured servants were plentiful and necessary, but they were also greatly limited in the scope
of productive work that they could perform and required much oversight.
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Further concerns about the labor supply were addressed in a statute of March 1642/3
when the Assembly suspended legal actions against people residing in Virginia who had fled
debt in England. The major concern that the Assembly cited to justify this action was that
allowing suits to collect said debts “might hazard the deserting of a great part of the country.”42
Such a protection would have also provided some encouragement to immigrate to precisely the
sort of workers about whom Berkeley expressed reservations. However, it also demonstrated the
dire need for labor of any sort in Virginia.
The treaty requirement that the Powhatan return runaway laborers of any background
showed that maintaining the labor supply and having an enforceable boundary could go hand in
hand. Despite the reservations of Berkeley and his class, they recognized the value of labor
provided by even the most base of their social inferiors. As long as this supply of labor was
forthcoming from across the Atlantic, there was never any incentive to coerce any significant
amount of indigenous labor. Thus, the most likely source of economic integration and the most
compelling argument against established boundaries and restrictions on movement were never
realized.
Indian Labor
Indian labor seemed to have been used by the English, though sparingly and in informal
capacities, prior to the March 1621/2 massacre. John Martin’s evaluation of the benefits of the
Powhatan to the English included a discussion on the use of indigenous labor.43 Whether
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Martin’s point was purely speculative or was built on the prior existence of such a pattern is
unclear in the writing. However, if the Powhatan did not work for the English directly, they
were certainly well acquainted with English economic activities.
Edward Waterhouse, a Virginia colonist whose narrative of the massacre served as the
Virginia Company’s official report, referred to the “daily familiarity” that the Powhatan had with
the English due to “trading and other negotiations.” It was this familiarity that allowed the
Powhatan to utterly surprise the English colonists, many of whom were killed “with their owne
tooles and weapons.”44 The presence of the Powhatan in their homes and fields was not at all
odd or alarming to the English prior to the massacre. Even if the Powhatan had not worked
directly for the English, Martin’s comments on employing them were probably based on an
intimate knowledge of their abilities. However, it is highly unlikely that the Powhatan would
have ever provided significant labor to the English. The English largely required agricultural
labor, seen as women’s work by Powhatan men, and enslavement was not a viable proposition
given the circumstances. Indentured servants fulfilled this purpose with less risk and greater
willingness.
Apparently a small-scale wartime trade in Powhatan slaves existed, though it seems to
have been short-lived. In 1626, the Council of Virginia granted member William Claiborne a
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monopoly on captured Powhatan prisoners.45 The implication was clearly that he was going to
sell these prisoners, or at least their labor, to someone.
There was also curious reference in the statutes of October 1629 to three Indians residing
in Jamestown who were to be considered under the charge of the colony.46 There was no
elaboration on who these three Indians were, but their presence in the midst of war is
noteworthy. The English were not at war with all Indian groups in the region, and it is possible
that these three individuals were from a tribe that was on friendly terms with the English. It is
also not explained for how long they had lived in the colony, either. What is evident from their
presence, though, is that the English recognized clear distinctions between Indian peoples and
individuals. The distinctions drawn were ethnic and political, and not racial in the modern-day
sense. While this did not preclude a sense of “otherness,” it did mean that there was not racial
motivation to enslave, reeducate, or exterminate Indian groups. Such impetuses typically came
later and for religious or cultural reasons.
There was also a reference to the transfer of ownership of two servants in
Accomack/Northampton County in 1645; “one Negro by name Domingo and one Indian boy by
name Thomas Bian.”47 The terms of the 1646 treaty also noted “that such Indian children as
shall or will freely and voluntarily come in and live with the English, may remain without breach
of the articles of peace provided they be not above twelve yeares old.”48 These references
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strongly imply that there were some Indian children living and working within the boundaries of
Virginia.
Records thus show that Indian servitude and possibly slavery existed by the 1640s, and
possibly earlier. The majority of indigenous people living and working with the English, though,
appear to have been children or teenagers.49 This would be consistent with the specifics offered
in the aforementioned court record and the treaty itself. Consistent, large scale use of adult
Indian labor by the English did not occur at this time.
Indians had been employed by the English as guides and hunters, and were seen by the
English as particularly useful with regard to keeping down the population of wolves, bears,
cougars, and other predators that could harm livestock.50 In 1638, Thomas Savage appears to
have hired some Indians to help him round up cattle, but these types of jobs did not represent a
source of consistent employment.51 Indian labor was a small and auxiliary segment of the
colonial economy within Virginia, which meant that the treaty boundaries did not significantly
impact the labor market in Virginia.
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Chapter IV. IMPACTS OF THE 1622 MASSACRE
Archaeologists working at and around Jamestown divide the site’s timeline between the
Early Fort Period (1607-1623) and the Post-Fort Period (1624-1660). This divide, so near to the
1621/2 massacre, corresponded with “a pattern in which material culture [indigenously-produced
goods such as beads, pottery, stone tools and weapons] associated with Native communities was
at first pervasive in the Fort. Subsequently, exchange relations that had been bilateral became
unidirectional. Food apparently moved from Native communities into the Fort while fewer trade
goods moved in the opposite direction.”52
For the first several years after the initial settlement of Jamestown in 1607, the English
survived in large part due to the generosity of the Powhatan, receiving food, sometimes in
exchange for metal tools, copper, or glass beads; sometimes as a gift.53 The Powhatan were the
dominant party in the Anglo-Powhatan relationship for much of the Early Fort period and apart
from the First Anglo-Powhatan War (1609-1614), the two societies engaged in a great deal of
economic exchange. This exchange was driven by English need and Powhatan exploitation
thereof. The Virginia Company perpetuated this situation by encouraging the local council to
give the Powhatan whatever they wanted in order to maintain peace and save the costs of
shipping grain.54 The vacillations of both the English and Powhatan during this early period
created a state of ambiguity regarding either side’s ultimate intentions.
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The Powhatan finally made a decisive move, carrying out a massacre of English
colonists. The surprise attack, under the leadership of Opechancanough, launched on 22 March
1621/2 had wide-reaching implications for the economic development of Virginia. The 1621/2
massacre thus makes a logical starting point for an analysis of economic developments that led to
the 1646 treaty.
The most immediate effect of the massacre was the demographic impact on the colonial
population. The non-indigenous population of Virginia in 1620, less than two years prior to the
attack, was roughly 2,200, and in the first census taken under royal control of the colony in
1624/1625, the population had fallen to 1,227.55 The attack itself caused 347 deaths, but clearly
impacted the decisions of many Virginians regarding their continued residency. Due to these
population losses, the geographic extent of Virginia effectively contracted, as well.
A second, only slightly less immediate effect of the massacre was the dissolution of the
Virginia Company of London and the transfer of the Virginia colony to royal control. This meant
that all governmental matters would now go through the local authorities, rather than the
company in London. Though the King was ostensibly in charge of the now royal colony, factors
of time, distance, and local knowledge left real power in the hands of local leaders, who arguably
reaped the greatest benefits from the 1646 treaty via their control of any trade.
The massacre also had psychological impacts that would profoundly affect AngloPowhatan interactions between 1622 and 1646. Shortly after the massacre, English retaliatory
attacks on Powhatan food supplies forced Opechancanough to negotiate. The meeting set for
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this purpose was a ruse concocted by the English and their Patawomeke allies, however, as
poisoned liquor was served to the Powhatan, followed by a surprise attack. Roughly 200
Powhatan were killed, including several important werowances.56
While these events did not lead to a complete severing of Anglo-Powhatan economic
interactions, the mutual suspicion with which each group viewed the other following these events
precluded any chance of an integrated Anglo-Powhatan economy such as existed to a certain
extent prior to the attack. However, trade and other interactions continued, albeit more
cautiously, even during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War (1622-1632). The economies were
thus still integrated during this conflict, though now more out of the English need for Powhatan
corn than consensual exchange.
In March 1623/4, the Assembly decreed “that the 22d of March be yeerly solemnized as
holliday.”57 This was the date of the massacre two years prior. On its surface, this would appear
to be simply matter of commemorating a horrific event during which hundreds of colonists died.
However, given the massive turnover in Virginia’s population due to high death rates and a
constant influx of new colonists, this commemoration was probably also meant to inform new
arrivals of why the colony was at war with the Powhatan. Given that just a few years after the
event, the majority of the population living in Virginia would have consisted of people who
would not have been present in the colony at the time of the massacre, such a remembrance made
political sense as a means of reinforcing English solidarity. It also meant that most of the
animosity from the English toward the Powhatan was in large part manufactured, rather than a
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visceral reaction to experiencing the event firsthand. This meant that when economic
opportunities presented themselves, many colonists would not have had the previous violence in
the backs of their minds. Contrast this to the colonists who would have been living in Virginia
when the treaty was agreed in 1646. Almost all of these colonists would have been present for
the 1644 massacre, which, although largely limited to the periphery of English settlement and
killing a smaller percentage of the colonial population, actually resulted in a greater total number
of deaths than the attack in 1621/2.
John Martin’s Evaluation of English War Aims
John Martin, one of the original Jamestown councilmen and, in 1622, a plantation owner,
articulated the war aims with an apparent eye toward the post-war future. Martin’s discussion is
worth examining at length, as it provides perhaps the most comprehensive account of the
economic situation at the start of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War in the records.
In the preface to his December 1622 tract, “The Manner Howe to Bringe the Indians into
Subiection,” Martin followed the title with the caveat, “wthout making an vtter extirpation of
them together wth the reasons.”58 Martin cited both his religious convictions and the potential
benefits that the Powhatan provided to the English as reasons for not wiping out the entire
population (Martin did not explore whether this was even a realistic possibility). The benefits
provided to the English by living in close proximity to the Powhatan were, in Martin’s view, the
fact that the Powhatan kept the populations of wolves, bears, and other beasts low, thus
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protecting the English and their cattle, and also that the Powhatan could provide useful labor in a
variety of fields.59
Martin further explained the economics of the Chesapeake in his suggestions for
crippling the Powhatan war effort. Along with sending raiding parties to destroy Powhatan corn
fields right before harvest time, Martin insisted that ships must be employed to patrol the bay and
thus cut off any Powhatan trade with Indians on the Eastern Shore. The Powhatan relied on
trading skins and other commodities with the Accomack - only nominally members of the
Powhatan chiefdom - who lived on the Eastern Shore in exchange for corn. By blockading this
trade, the English would both cut off a vital food supply to the Powhatan, and could gain a
monopoly on trade with the Eastern Shore tribes, who, now deprived of animal skins, would
require cloth that only the English could provide.60
Another piece of Martin’s plan involved cutting off all trade with the Powhatan and their
allies. Martin was convinced that the trade between the Powhatan and the English throughout
the years prior to the war had enabled the Powhatan leader, Opechancanough, to amass enough
wealth to hire auxiliary warriors. Martin also believed that by depriving the Powhatan of most of
their trade, the necessity of good relations with the English would quickly become apparent to
them.61
Two points of comparison stand out with regard to the 1646 treaty. First, the English
were still reliant on trade for corn at this point and were seeking it via indigenous sources. It is
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notable that it was the Accomack on the Eastern Shore, and not the Powhatan, from whom they
sought this trade in cloth for corn. As opposed to 1646, when the English had sufficient quantity
of corn to export it and were even dabbling in wheat production, the colonists in 1622 had to
carefully consider how their interactions with indigenous peoples would impact their food
supply.
Second, Martin was clearly looking beyond the war and foresaw a somewhat integrated
economy as had existed previously, with Powhatan laborers working for the English and tighter
English control over the Powhatan economy. By 1646, the economic developments within
Virginia led both the English and the Powhatan to conclude a treaty that effectively separated
their economies.
Second Anglo-Powhatan War
In March 1629/30, eight years after the massacre that began it, the Assembly ordered
“that the war begun upon the Indians bee effectually followed, and that noe peace bee concluded
with them. And likewise that all marches which shall hereafter bee ordered and appointed
against them, be prosequted and followed with all diligence.”62
The statute implied that previously ordered marches were not carried out to the
Assembly’s satisfaction. The reasons as to why previously ordered marches were not
sufficiently executed were probably due to economic or logistical considerations rather than any
sense of compassion on the part of the English colonists, but it would seem that prosecuting the
war against the Powhatan was not a pressing matter for many of them.
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The lack of zeal with which the colonists pursued the war with the Powhatan was likely
due to the colony’s manpower already being fully employed in more profitable agricultural tasks.
In a letter dated 6 April 1626, the authorities in Virginia explained to the Privy Council in
London that fully prosecuting the war with the Powhatan “will require no less nmbers then five
hundred soldiers to be yearly sent over for certen yeeres, wth a full yeers pvisione of victuals,
apparell, armes, munitions, toole, & all necessryes.”63
The request was quite stunning, as five hundred soldiers would have increased the
English population in Virginia by nearly forty percent.64 Whether the request was made in
earnest, or inflated to convey a sense of urgency, it spoke to the enormity of the task of
effectively waging war against the Powhatan. There simply was not enough local manpower to
spare for the job. Assurances to those who fought that they would be taken care of in the event
of injury were apparently required to ensure compliance, as well.

An earlier statute from March

1623/4 declared that “those that shall be hurte upon service to be cured at the publique charge; in
case any be lamed to be maintained by the country according to his person and quality.”65
The Assembly again addressed matters of Anglo-Indian interactions in the February
1631/2 session, ordering “that no person or persons shall dare to speake or parlie with any
Indians either in the woods or in any plantation, yf he can possibly avoyd it by any meanes, but
as soone as he can, to bringe them to the commander, or give the commander notice thereof
uppon penalty of a mounthes service for any free man offendinge and twenty stripes to any
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servant.”66 The implications of this statute were that English colonists were, in fact, meeting
with Indians on something akin to friendly terms and outside the scope of official colonial
authority. While there is no clear reference to trade, it seems plausible that such meetings were
more than just social interactions. Otherwise, why would anyone have taken the risk?
A later statute reiterates the prohibition on trading with Indians in nearly identical
language to the March 1623/4 statutes.67 Given that this is followed by a list of the same statutes
regarding interactions with the Indians that also appear in the March 1623/4 statutes, it appears
that the Assembly simply recycled most of the regulations.
The Second Anglo-Powhatan War ended in late 1632, though aside from a few larger
engagements there was never much sustained or substantial conflict. After the initial massacre
and retaliatory actions that began the conflict, most military action consisted of brief raids
designed to destroy or capture enemy food supplies. From the exhortations in the statutes, it
would appear that these raids were not always carried out in the manner desired by the
Assembly, if they occurred at all. Further, the repetition of prohibitions on trade with Indians,
and the specific threat of punishment for speaking with Indians strongly imply that such
interactions were taking place despite the prohibitions.
Even in a time of formal conflict, then, the colonists and the Powhatan had reasons for
engaging in economic interactions. Clearly, the Powhatan were supplying grain to the English,
though not always willingly. Also, the individual interactions, though they did not drastically
alter the economic development of the colony, probably did serve to undermine the political
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authority of colonial and Powhatan leadership, especially if some individuals were trading
weapons to the Powhatan. By 1646, having fought another, albeit shorter, war, political
authorities recognized that the economic developments since the prior conflict meant the two
sides no longer relied on one another for any essential items. Formal disintegration represented
very little economic losses for either side as a whole, and offered territorial and political integrity
to both. Those individuals well-positioned to gain from trade had little to fear as they were still
allowed to carry on exchange via the designated forts.
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Chapter V. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLISH VIRGINIA, 1622-1646
Tobacco
Virginia’s was a specialized economy. By the 1640s, the best way to make money in
Virginia was to grow tobacco, and not only because of the ready market for export. Having
relied on tobacco since the late 1610s, the entire infrastructure of Virginia was built to support
tobacco production. The indentured labor system insured a steady supply of workers, who did
not need to be well-educated or especially skilled. There was a fairly stable regulatory structure
in place and links with European merchants were well established.
To understand the reluctance to diversify away from tobacco, one must appreciate that
several decades of path-dependent development toward a tobacco-centered economy created
huge start-up and opportunity costs to anyone desiring to move into new industries. As will be
discussed below, the eventual development of a secondary industry based on grain production for
export did develop, but this was largely because the infrastructure for tobacco production was
easily adapted to this pursuit.
Given the propensity of tobacco to quickly deplete the soil, continued geographic
expansion was required to sustain an economy built on tobacco. The 1646 treaty’s clear
bounding of English settlement could thus be read in part as an effort by those favoring
diversification to curb the spread of tobacco agriculture. Diversification supporters would have
been buoyed by the fact that the tobacco “economy was severely depressed until at least 1643,”
and the subsequent rise in prices in 1644 was offset by the small size of the crop that year.68 The
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massacre in 1644 and the ongoing war with the Powhatan until late 1646 would likely have
limited tobacco production in these years, as well. Again, increased diversity of production was
never fully realized, but the notion of putting tobacco land to other productive uses may not have
been as far-fetched at this specific time as it would have seemed at most other times.
Increased population in the Chesapeake could have facilitated economic diversification
by adding to the pool of labor and human capital resources that could be employed in a wider
array of specialized economic roles. Despite significant population growth between 1624 and
1640 – the non-indigenous population rose by 751 percent, from 1,227 to 10,442, in this span –
much of the additional labor went toward expanding tobacco production, which required little in
the way of specialized skills and required huge amounts of labor. Thus the increased labor came
with little of the additional human capital required for diversification. Physical capital was also
limited as much of the imported goods exchanged for Virginia tobacco were finished consumer
goods.
John McCusker and Russell Menard’s analysis of the Chesapeake tobacco industry, while
admittedly somewhat speculative given large gaps in the data, nevertheless was able to identify
two important trends between roughly the 1620s and 1680s: 1) Chesapeake tobacco production
grew quite significantly, and 2) farm prices received by tobacco growers dropped.69 While the
trends that McCusker and Menard identified were broad, they do seem to indicate that the
Atlantic tobacco market responded to an increased supply with lower prices as growing demand
was outpaced by even faster growing production. What is less obvious is why planters continued
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to produce tobacco as the prices fell. McCusker and Menard pointed to productivity gains,
including “smaller risks, cheaper credit, falling prices for manufactured goods and foodstuffs,
greater output per worker, savings in distribution costs, and lower customs charges.” The fact
that Virginia’s infrastructure and regulatory system were already established for tobacco
production helped keep start-up and expansion costs low, as well.
This trend lasted well beyond the 1646 treaty, until roughly 1660, when planters and
merchants were no longer able to pass on cost reductions to consumers. 70 That is, the marginal
revenue from tobacco was still higher than the marginal costs of production during the period
leading up to the treaty. This was simply not the case for most other goods that Virginians could
produce during this time.71 Between about 1620 and 1660, people looking to profit in the
Chesapeake quite reasonably saw tobacco as the best investment opportunity in the midseventeenth century Chesapeake.
Though it was largely grown for export, the intense focus on tobacco did have important
impacts on the local Chesapeake economy. This should be an obvious point, but it bears
emphasis: heavy investment of time and resources in tobacco production meant that the English
in Virginia relied on trade to fulfill many of their material needs. A well-diversified local
economy would theoretically have promoted greater endogenous exchange and thus would have
reduced reliance on exogenous trade.
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The English in Virginia recognized that their reliance on tobacco necessitated trade, so
rather than abandon what was more often than not a profitable crop for which the requisite
infrastructure already existed, they chose to pursue what had become their comparative
advantage. Trade with Dutch merchants had been ongoing for decades and picked up with the
start of the English Civil War.72 This provided a ready outlet for surplus tobacco while also
bringing in consumer goods.
Despite the strict boundary drawn between English and Powhatan territory in 1646, trade
between these groups was still permitted, even if now more tightly regulated.73 However,
finding profitable items to exchange became much more difficult. Besides the fact that, by 1646,
the Virginians produced little locally that the Powhatan desired, the effect of increasing trade
with other colonies and countries was that the Powhatan had little that the Virginians wanted that
they could not obtain from other sources. Instead, the heavy reliance on imported consumer
goods placed the Powhatan and English in competing roles as consumers of the same supply of
goods. This was significantly different from the situation during and at the end of the Second
Anglo-Powhatan War in 1632, when both parties still saw potential benefits from exchange.
The Failure of Diversification
Despite the economic importance of Virginia tobacco, not everyone viewed tobacco
monoculture as desirable or sustainable. The English government made frequent efforts to
introduce other industries to the colony, though nothing ever seriously threatened to supplant
tobacco agriculture as the predominant economic activity.
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On 24 July 1621, the Virginia Company of London laid out its instructions to Governor
Francis Wyatt in his initial commission. In these instructions, there was a clear desire for
economic diversification in the following admonishments:
To take care of every plantation … not to plant above one hundred pounds of tobacco per
head; to sow great quantities of corn for their own use … to inclose lands; to keep cows,
swine, poultry, etc, and particularly kyne [pl. cow], which are not to be killed yet: Next to
corn, plant mulberry trees, and make silk … plant abundance of vine … to put prentices
to trades, and not let them forsake their trades for planting tobacco, or any such useless
commodity: to take care of the Dutch sent to build saw-mills … To make salt, pitch, tar,
soap, ashes, etc., so often recommended, and for which materials had been sent; to make
oyl of walnuts, and employ apothecaries in distilling lees [yeast particulates] of beer, and
searching after minerals, dyes, gums, and drugs, etc. and to send small quantities home.74
The same advice was again given to the colony when it fell under royal control upon the
dissolution of the Virginia Company. In a letter dated 26 March 1628, the Virginia assembly
replied to a letter from King Charles I that had put forth certain restrictions on tobacco
production and evidently reiterated the economic policies in Governor Wyatt’s instructions of
1621.75 The Assembly opposed measures to drastically reduce tobacco production and trade in
Virginia, and went on to address the problems with the other suggested economic activities:
As to pitch and tar, the country abounded in pine trees, from which it could be produced;
but owing to the want of horses and carriages, and the danger of sending the people into
the woods, on account of the Indians, it was deemed inexpedient at that time, to attempt
to make those articles for exportation. Pot-ashes has formerly been made, but the
planters were not acquainted with the process. Pipe-staves, barrel-boards, and clappboards, could be had in great abundance, but the freight was too dear to render it an
object to export them. 76
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In the case of the more practical industries, the colony was hampered by a lack of resources, by
the ongoing war with the Powhatan, and simple economic calculations. The colonists recognized
that they possessed no comparative advantage in the production of practical goods with small
profit margins, especially when shipping costs were factored. The Powhatan did not have any
great demand for most of the items that the Virginia colony could have produced locally. Thus
the lack of an indigenous market that could have negated the prohibitive shipping costs
combined with the intense focus on a mercantilist policy of production for export to England
hindered these efforts.
The establishment of an iron works was actually a reality, albeit short-lived. As noted
here, the works were built, but soon after destroyed in the 1621/2 massacre. This capital
investment could have produced goods for which the Powhatan would have readily traded, thus
making it a potentially profitable effort. The biggest obstacle to rebuilding appears to have been
a lack of physical and human capital to rebuild and sustain it.
The iron ore at Falling Creek was esteemed of good quality, and considerable progress
had been made in erecting a furnace, when the settlement and most of the workmen were
cut off by the Indians, at the massacre, and the tools thrown into the river; and that the
work could not be resumed without a fresh supply of workmen, money, tools, etc.77
The letter continued “as to mines of gold, silver, copper, etc. they have great hopes that the
mountains are very rich … but they have not the means of transporting the ore.78 The references
to gold and silver were wishful thinking, and while there were copper deposits in the Piedmont
regions, these were under the control of the Monacans, not the Powhatan. Thus obtaining this

77
78

Ibid.
Ibid.

49
copper would have required geographic expansion beyond Virginia’s capabilities, and the colony
could import it, if need be. Further, given the collapse of the local copper market, the usefulness
of this copper would have been in making alloy for tools. However, the English do not appear to
have found the requisite local supplies of zinc for making such alloys, so this industry would
quickly have run into the same profitability problems as the earlier dismissed clapboard and
stave-making trades.79
The most promising economic pursuit besides tobacco appeared to be the fishing
industry, but the greatest potential gains in that field were far north of Virginia in Canada – not
exactly a boon to local diversification. Those sent to establish a wine industry saw little profit
when compared to fishing:
With respect to the planting of vines, they [government officials in London] have great
hope, that it will prove a beneficial commodity; but the vignerors sent here either did not
understand the business, or concealed their skill; for they spent their time to little
purpose. They expect great benefit from fishing in the bay, and upon the coast of
Canada, where some trial had been made.”80
It is highly probable that some Virginians did pursue this opportunity since in February of
1631/2, the Assembly passed a statute regulating the size and type of ships that could legally
travel to Canada.81 Before Virginia could seriously consider any meaningful program of
economic diversification, it required an influx of highly specialized human capital and
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inducements, economic or otherwise, for colonists to actually engage in these diverse economic
activities.
The Assembly’s reply indicated that little progress had been made in the seven years
since the initial instructions were given. Progress was arrested not only due to the better
economic return that one could expect from tobacco, but also due to very real material
limitations in Virginia and the ongoing Second Anglo-Powhatan War (1622-1632). An account
of the 1621/2 massacre offered some hints as to what the routine economic activities of the
colonists were, citing “planting Corne and Tobacco … gardening … making Bricke, building,
sawing, and other kindes of husbandry” as typical daily work.82 All of these activities were
required simply for subsistence in Virginia, with tobacco being the only reliable source of profit.
It would seem that little changed in the following decade.
Nearly four years after the Assembly articulated the problems with pursuing
diversification, it passed a series of statutes in February 1631/2 that attempted to control the
supply and quality of tobacco in Virginia. In effect, the colony was going all-in on tobacco and
decided to clamp down on the quality of the product it produced. All goods shipping to and from
Virginia were required to pass through Jamestown in order that colonial authorities could
monitor and tax all trade. Limits were placed on the amount of tobacco any one person could
plant and tend, penalties for trading in poor quality tobacco and deadlines for harvesting the
yearly tobacco crop were imposed, and “every man working in the ground” was required to plant
and tend a minimum of two acres of corn.83 The specific details of the policies were slightly
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revised in February of 1632/3, but the general restrictions on excessive tobacco production
remained largely intact.
Several other statutes that the Assembly passed in September of 1632 and February of
1632/3 stand out with regards to the matters of economic diversification and retention of human
capital. First, in September 1632 the Assembly required anyone leaving the colony to give
advance notice and made any ship captain who transported any person who had failed to give
such notice responsible for the evacuee’s debts.84 The statute does not specify that this applied
only to indentured servants and their contracts, so it is probable that some planters who had
accumulated large debts attempted to flee the colony, as well. Second, in February of 1632/3,
the Assembly required “that all gunsmiths and naylers, brickmakers, carpenters, joyners,
sawyers, and turners, be compelled to worke at theire trades and not suffered to plant tobacco or
corne or doe any other worke in the ground.”85
The Assembly clearly recognized the need to hold onto the capital – human and animal and labor required to promote a more diversified local economy. However, the effort to maintain
the labor supply did not do much to increase the amount of capital. This meant that the Virginia
economy continued to grow, allowing for greater specialization and economies of scale as both
physical infrastructure and regulatory systems evolved with the expanding tobacco industry.
But, the growth of other industries did not occur on any significant scale. With regard to
separating the English and Powhatan labor pools, the treaty was simply formalizing the status
quo that existed due to economic and cultural realities. However, the jurisdictional boundaries
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added an enforcement mechanism that allowed the political authorities on both sides to more
tightly control the movement of their respective populations and of trade goods.
William Berkeley’s Hope of Economic Diversification
Sir William Berkeley was appointed governor of Virginia in 1641 and “was the first royal
governor who understood diversification, who believed in it, and who stayed in Virginia long
enough to give it a chance of succeeding.”86 Agricultural diversification was also an ostensible
priority of the previous governor, John Harvey, but his ongoing conflicts with the assembly
meant that his plans were never executed. Berkeley was governor when the 1646 treaty was
enacted and it seems plausible that his views would have influenced the treaty’s contents.
Even so ardent an advocate of diversification as William Berkeley recognized that
Virginia could not abandon all exogenous trade. In fact, he welcomed trade as a way to support
a diverse Virginia economy. In evaluating Berkeley’s advocacy of diversification, historian
Warren Billings wrote, “Berkeley always understood that success in diversification was tied to
establishing outlets for his produce…He therefore used the powers of his office to encourage a
Virginia-Dutch trade as well as to extend commercial relations with other colonies on the North
American mainland and in the Caribbean.”87 All of this was very much in line with the
prevailing mercantilist sentiments of the period.
Berkeley’s belief in diversification was inspired by the commonly held view in the 17th
century that domestic production of otherwise imported goods would increase the prosperity of
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that country.88 By many in England, including King Charles I, Virginia was seen as a potentially
fruitful colony, if only it could diversify its agriculture production beyond tobacco.89 Berkeley
did break with the prevailing mercantile view that all colonial production be for the good of the
mother country and advocated for free trade for Virginians on several occasions, though without
much success.90 Thus his views on diversification were not wholly driven by a commitment to
English mercantilism, although he did not reject the custom of controlling trade via the sale of
trading licenses.
This view had important implications for Anglo-Powhatan trade, as the Powhatan did not
provide a suitable outlet for Virginia’s products (i.e. tobacco, cattle, and grain). Rather, the
goods demanded by the Powhatan were the same goods that the colonists desired and often had
to be imported from Europe.91 As the colonists became more secure in producing their own
sustenance, the role of the Powhatan as producers of corn was rendered even less significant, and
there was not a ready alternative that the Powhatan were willing or able to produce.
From 1607 on, the most important commodity that the Powhatan had supplied to the
English was corn. By the mid-1630s, though, the English were producing surplus quantities of
corn and other grain. Labor was always in high demand in English Virginia, but the Powhatan
were not employed in the agricultural labor that was essential to Virginia’s economy. The
English planters had both economic and cultural reasons for preferring indentured labor from
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Europe to Powhatan labor. Corn thus lost much of its value as a trade good in the local market,
and the Powhatan were unwilling to supply the type or quantity of labor increasingly demanded
by the English. Virginia’s increased integration with the larger Atlantic marketplace meant
disintegration of the Anglo-Powhatan economy in Virginia.
Tobacco Pipes
A 2005 paper by C. Jane Cox, et al summarized the archaeological record on locallyproduced tobacco pipes in the Chesapeake region. Several of the conclusions in this paper are
useful in understanding the economic relevance of the 1646 treaty ending the Third AngloPowhatan War. First, Cox, et al wrote that “the overwhelming majority of Chesapeake pipes
pre-date 1670, with the larger assemblages occurring in pre-1650 contexts.”92 The early sites
that lacked locally-produced pipes were occupied by traders who would have had access to
European-made pipes early on. The implication is that while tobacco pipes were clearly a
desirable commodity, considerations of cost, quality, and availability drove consumers’ decisions
regarding the pipes that they obtained. Most colonists who desired pipes had to obtain cheaper,
locally-made versions, while the upper class was able to purchase more expensive, high-quality
European imports. Over time, imports increased in quantity and dropped in price while local
production declined.
The authors also pointed out that production of tobacco pipes was both labor and capital
intensive, concluding that production of tobacco pipes was not simply a pastime.93 It required an
intensive investment of time and capital. The decision to produce tobacco pipes at any scale,
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then, would have required long-term planning and substantial capital investment. Thus once
European imports became cheaper than locally-produced pipes, colonial consumers made the
switch.
The ultimate drop in local pipe production seemed to be tied to larger market forces.
Though some colonists clung to the industry, it was simply not possible to compete with the
efficiencies and economies of scale that European producers could exploit.94 The efficiency of
large-scale production in Europe meant that would-be colonial pipe makers saw little advantage
in trying to compete. This further reduced incentives for colonists to pursue production of
consumer goods, driving them instead toward more profitable pursuits like tobacco.
The temporal proximity of the 1646 Anglo-Powhatan treaty to the 1650 threshold for the
end of large-scale local tobacco pipe production in the Chesapeake does not, of course, directly
link the two events. That the English in Virginia saw fit to impose stringent controls on crosscultural trade at the same time that local patterns of production were changing does, however,
speak to the importance of the economic shifts that were occurring in the 1640s in Virginia.
Further, there is evidence via the archaeological record that local production of tobacco pipes in
the Chesapeake did continue beyond the mid-seventeenth century, but almost entirely in Native
American contexts.95 This implies that indigenous access to European pipes declined after the
treaty, stimulating more indigenous production, which in turn lowered indigenous demand for
European pipes further.
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In shifting from producers to consumers, the Virginians effectively eliminated the local
supply of pipes in Virginia, and created a large enough shift in demand that English and Dutch
shippers were willing to supply the pipes in large quantities to the Virginia market. The
increased demand amongst Virginians who had abandoned local production drove the
equilibrium price higher. In order for trade in pipes to be profitable once local production
effectively disappeared, one had to have access to both large quantities of cheap European-made
pipes, and an indigenous market that could provide profitable trade goods, such as furs, in return.
Both conditions were not always fulfilled and such a situation favored those who were able to
obtain and transport large quantities of goods and who had legal access to lucrative indigenous
markets. Especially after the 1646 treaty was agreed, this would have been pertinent only to
established traders with the requisite political connections.
Dutch Trade
The first recorded trade with Dutch ships at Jamestown occurred in 1619 and continued
as an ever-present, if insignificant, segment of the colonial Virginia economy until the late
1630s.96 By the late 1630s, the English empire was in an economic depression.97 The vast
increases in Virginia tobacco production outstripped English shipping capacity and demand,
opening opportunities for Dutch ships to take up the surplus.
The outbreak of Civil War in England in 1642 disrupted English trade, opening even
more opportunities to enterprising Dutch shippers.98 Dutch shipping was thus a major
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component of the Virginia economy until the passage of an act by Parliament in 1650 that
prohibited any English colonies from trading until they formally submitted to Parliament’s
authority, King Charles I having been executed the previous year.99 The Navigation Act of 1651
officially shut down all colonial trade not done via English vessels and ended all (legal) Dutch
trade in Virginia.100
During the 1640s when the Anglo-Dutch trade in Virginia was at its peak, tobacco was
the main export leaving the colony on Dutch ships. Though the first recorded Dutch trade in
Virginia included several Africans who were sold into servitude, the Dutch trade into Virginia in
the mid-seventeenth century was not predominantly in African workers. By 1650, there were
only about 400 persons of African origin in English Virginia, constituting only 2.2% of the nonindigenous population.101 In 1650, then, Virginia’s economy was not yet operating primarily via
slave labor and the legal status of most Africans was ambiguous, though probably in many cases
it was about the same as that of white indentured servants.102 The importation of slave labor as a
major component of the colonial economy was still several decades in the future.
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What the Dutch did bring to Virginia can be guessed at by the existence of Dutch wares
found in archaeological digs throughout the Chesapeake. In the case of tobacco pipes, artifacts
can be identified by their markings, and in some cases by the presence of the manufacturer’s
name. It is clear in the archaeological record that many Dutch-made tobacco pipes ended up in
Virginia.103 Further, there are references to Dutch tin- and lead-glazed roofing tiles, ceramics,
and glassware. 104 There is also a court record that dealt with the trade of tobacco to a Dutch ship
for cloth, knives, and piercer bits.105 The piercer bits were probably used for mortise and tenon
joining, so they were almost certainly shipped for English consumption. The cloth and knives
would have had value for both the colonial and indigenous populations.
The contents of Dutch ships did not appear to be unique when compared to the goods
coming to Virginia on English ships. However, Dutch ships were able to trade for surplus
tobacco that otherwise lacked buyers, or were able to offer better prices than their English
counterparts while still providing the same bundle of goods for which the colonists were already
trading. Trading with the Dutch thus created a market for surplus tobacco, driving the industry at
a time when it otherwise could have contracted.106 Also, the Dutch were not beholden to any of
the contracts agreed between English merchants and Virginia planters, which allowed for a freer
market. The Dutch were more likely to pay market value, which when higher than the English
contract prices created a substitution effect for the English colonists.
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The increased reliance on the Dutch trade at the start of the English Civil War in 1642,
and the even more pressing need for trade with the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Powhatan War
in 1644, solidified the essential role of the Dutch trade to Virginia’s economy. In 1642/3, the
Virginia Assembly enacted a statute declaring, “it shall be free and lawfull for any merchant,
factors, or others of the Dutch nation to import wares and merchandizes and to trade or traffique
for the commoditys of the collony in any shipp or shipps of their own or belonging to the
Netherlands.”107 Despite no mention of the Dutch trade being made in the 1646 treaty, it almost
certainly played into the thinking of the Assembly when it restricted Anglo-Powhatan trade to
two forts.
Thanks to the Dutch trade, Virginians were able to maintain their specialized focus on
tobacco. As mentioned previously, specialization necessitated trade. However, compared to the
1620s, by the 1640s, the production of cattle and corn within Virginia meant that the colony was
no longer reliant on outside food sources – a role previously filled by the Powhatan and other
neighboring Indian groups. Whereas in the 1620s Virginians had to produce or trade for
consumer goods, which they then would trade for food, the Dutch provided desirable consumer
goods in exchange for tobacco that Virginians were already growing.
An increased population and several decades of experience made agricultural production
in Virginia a viable and stable industry. Indian labor in production of surplus grain was made
redundant by imported indentured labor. With no corresponding shift in production in the
Powhatan economy, the grain trade - once vital – was rendered obsolete. In 1646, the leadership
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of Virginia saw no compelling reason to maintain widespread exchange with the Powhatan,
given that English, and now Dutch, shipping provided outlets for Virginia’s production and a
steady supply of consumer goods. From the Powhatan perspective, anything that they could get
from the English colonists, they could also get from the Dutch, and probably at a lower cost if
they traded with the Dutch directly.
Cattle
After the 1621/2 massacre, Edward Waterhouse estimated that there were roughly 1,500,
or roughly one head per person, cattle in Virginia.108 In August 1633, a statute forbidding the
export of “cowes, heifers, or female catle” was enacted in order to further increase the cattle
population, which had “inritcht this colony.”109 By January 1639/40, the Assembly had loosened
this restriction, declaring that “any person may export to New England or other neighboring
colony the 7th head of neat cattle and no more.”110 Cattle would have provided numerous
benefits to the Virginia colony, although cattle ultimately became so numerous to be a nuisance,
as demonstrated by the statutes requiring the fencing of fields in 1642/3 and 1646.111
One benefit that cattle probably did not provide in abundance, however, was labor.
Tobacco cultivation as practiced in early Virginia did not require plowing as would have cereal
crops, and it was not recommended practice to manure tobacco fields.112 Cattle were little
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discussed outside of a handful of statutes, though they appear in many probate records, but it
seems plausible that an increased cattle population would have fit a diversification agenda that
desired an increase in the cultivation of cereal crops, as well as a stable supply of meat, leather,
and perhaps milk. The statute forbidding export of female cattle in August 1633 certainly would
fit with the chronology of the statutes of 1631 and 1633 attempting to encourage more diverse
economic activity.
The explicit reference to New England in the 1639/40 Virginia statute allowing a small
proportion of cattle to be exported would seem to indicate that such trade was, in fact, occurring.
Further evidence of this trade could be inferred from cattle prices in the Plymouth colony in
modern-day Massachusetts at the time. Data from the Plymouth Archaeological Research
Project indicated that cattle prices in the Plymouth colony spiked around 1638, then dropped
substantially in the early 1640s.113 It seems plausible that the statute in Virginia was at least in
part a response to high cattle prices in New England, especially given the local prices in Virginia
remained quite stable throughout the 1640s and 1650s.114 There is also reference to “live Cattle,
Beef and Tobacco” being sent from Virginia to Barbados, where “an Ox of 5£ pound price at
Virginia, will yield 25£.”115
What this indicates is that the Virginia colony was aware of and responsive to larger
economic trends beyond the tobacco market. Raising cattle required little in the way of
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infrastructure and the supply was substantial, partially feral, and largely self-sustaining. The
cattle population of Virginia was estimated at about 20,000, or roughly two head per person, in
1649 and newcomers to Virginia by this time “were advised that they could purchase cattle in the
colony to stock their plantations.”116 The increase in cattle population and the opening of a
small-scale export trade did little to interfere with tobacco production or to increase economic
diversification at the start of the 1640s, however.
The 1646 treaty included a provision allowing the English to cross the northern boundary
of the York River until March of the following year in order to kill or collect whatever cattle and
hogs they could.117 This showed that the English deemed the cattle valuable enough to recover
in this instance. Although there is not clear connection between the treaty and the statute that
finally lifted the ban on exporting hides from Virginia several months prior, this could have been
another reason for attempting to collect the errant livestock.118
A major reason that the growth of the cattle population and cattle trade worked to
disintegrate the Anglo-Powhatan economy was that the deer on which the Powhatan relied were
an effective substitute for English cattle. Even if the Powhatan did turn to cattle to supplement a
diminished deer population, it would not have been difficult to obtain beef via hunting. Though
killing English cattle carried some risk of retribution, the Powhatan most likely could have culled
a few members of a semi-feral herd without having to interact directly with the colonists. Either
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way, it does not appear that the deer population had been drastically reduced by the time of
treaty.119
Cattle exports to New England and the West Indies, as previously noted, provided
opportunities for large profits margins. This had the effect of increasing Virginia’s economic
ties with other English colonies. At the same time, the Powhatan had little demand for English
cattle, which they saw largely as a destructive nuisance. The almost lackadaisical manner of
cattle husbandry practiced by the English colonists did not divert many resources from tobacco
production, but potential profits from the cattle trade did divert English attention and resources to
other markets. The vastly increased cattle population can help to explain the treaty in that it
further directed Virginia’s economic activity away from the Powhatan while simultaneously
providing a reason for the Powhatan to separate themselves from the colony.
Indians and Livestock
There is no clear evidence that the Powhatan attempted to raise domesticated livestock
prior to the 1646 treaty. In 1656, the Assembly offered a bounty of one cow to an Indian leader
in exchange for eight wolf heads.120 This was probably truly a bounty to protect livestock, as the
requisite proof was the head, rather than the pelt, of the wolf. That is, the benefits derived from
the service of killing the wolf was the object of value in this exchange. The more insidious idea
was that providing Indians with cattle specifically would be a step toward civilizing them, as the
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English viewed cattle husbandry as uniquely civilized given the relatively high level of tending
cattle required as opposed to other types of livestock.121 While this was revealing of English
attitudes about the role of livestock, it also showed that the Powhatan had not adopted husbandry
in any European sense even ten years after the treaty. This supports the idea that further
economic integration was not attractive in 1646 if it required serious cultural shifts. Although
hunting feral livestock would not have been a serious cultural breach for the Powhatan, and there
is reference in the statutes to Indians attacking livestock, to what purpose is unclear.122 This
could have been a matter of acquiring food, or of protecting agricultural resources.
Archaeological analysis of two late-seventeenth century sites north of Virginia (Camden and
Posey) which were occupied by indigenous populations showed that English-introduced
livestock still made up a very small proportion of faunal sustenance as late as the 1670s. 123
In his work on the impact of agriculture in the New England colonies, William Cronon
found evidence that some Indians there had started raising European livestock by the end of the
seventeenth century.124 Virginia Anderson explored this issue in Creatures of Empire, and found
that some Chesapeake-area tribes had acquired pigs by the 1650s and 1660s.125 In choosing pigs
over other English livestock, Indians were opting for the least amount of marginal maintenance
cost in return for meat. There is also evidence of domesticated animals becoming substitutes for
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increasing scarce wildlife in New England, and this pattern could plausibly transfer to Virginia.
This indicates that Indians were perfectly capable of making economic calculations, but the
instances of livestock as a desirable commodity to the Powhatan postdate the 1646 treaty.
The spread of feral livestock populations clearly impacted English agriculture, as
demonstrated in the aforementioned fencing statutes, and it seems likely that these animals
would have threatened indigenous agricultural plots, as well. In 1660 in
Accomack/Northampton County, there is a formal complaint in the court records from the
Gingaskin Indians that the English livestock were damaging their crops.126 There is also the
possibility that Indians killed livestock simply because they knew that the English valued it and
it was wartime. Most likely it was some combination of these factors dependent on the specific
circumstances.
The takeaway is that while the English increasingly relied on livestock as a food source,
the indigenous population had not made this shift as of 1646. The enlarged populations of cattle,
pigs, and to a lesser extent horses, goats, and sheep posed problems for the English, who dealt
with them by erecting fencing, as well as for Indians, who did not erect fencing both because it
was costly in time and resources, and because to do so would have acknowledged the English
property rights to livestock. Further, the alien livestock would have displaced to some degree the
indigenous fauna on which Indian populations continued to rely, potentially causing changes in
hunting patterns and food production more generally.127
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The treaty specified that colonists could collect livestock north of the York, but it was not
clear if this was to allow colonists to recover property, a courtesy to the Indians, or both. What is
clear is that in 1646, the Powhatan did not regard livestock as a valuable commodity in the sense
that the English did. The English, despite their apparent ambivalence toward their roving herds
of cattle and swine, did believe that the animals were their property and attempted to recover
damages if they were killed. While it seems plausible that the livestock killed by Indians was
eaten, it does appear that domesticated animals had supplanted indigenous fauna in Powhatan
diets or minds. Cattle and swine were more likely to cause conflict than provide a basis trade at
this time, and it is possible that the Powhatan saw a clear boundary as a way to prevent further
encroachment of English livestock.
Anderson noted that issues of animal trespass that involved colonists and Indians often
became public matters. Indian leaders who could extract compensation from the English for
damage caused by English livestock gained both political prestige and material goods.128 The
treaty terms stipulating that only messengers from Powhatan leaders could gain safe passage to
conduct diplomacy in Virginia could be connected to this. However, there were few barriers to
prevent semi-feral livestock from crossing what was now a clearly defined and mutually-agreed
boundary. If Powhatan leaders saw an opportunity to consolidate their power via extracting
compensatory payments for damage caused by English livestock, then a clear boundary and a
monopoly over who could cross it was an attractive proposition.
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Conclusions on Production within Virginia
The pattern of production within Virginia from 1622 until the 1640s never diversified in
any meaningful way, and certainly fell well short of the hopes that had initially been present in
the 1621 instructions given to Governor Wyatt. Virginians ultimately invested much of their
time and energy in tobacco production, and much of the remaining resources were devoted to
food production, at least when mandated by the Assembly. In the 1630s and 1640s, trade in
agricultural products occurred with New England and the West Indies, but surplus cattle and
grain were hardly the products of a diversified colony. The English government’s desire that
Virginia produce a wider variety of goods for export remained unfulfilled.
Per the Assembly’s reply to King Charles I in 1628, there were obvious logistical issues
with setting up and maintaining the recommended industries. The difficulties of obtaining
skilled workers and then keeping them in Virginia was one difficulty. The massive start-up costs
of building an industry from scratch would have been prohibitive even for skilled and
experienced workers, who were always few.129 In contrast, raising what were essentially freerange cattle and other livestock was not labor- or capital-intensive. Cultivating tobacco was land
and labor intensive, but required few specialized skills and all of these could be learned relatively
quickly upon arrival in Virginia. The land and infrastructure to support tobacco cultivation was
readily available. When forced to do so, Virginians could also produce plentiful quantities of
food.
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While a specialized economy necessitated trade, several other factors worked against a
return to a more integrated Anglo-Powhatan economy. The Powhatan’s potential role as a
supplier of grain became largely moot once Virginia’s production of corn stabilized sometime in
the early 1630s, and trade with England and the Netherlands provided many of the consumer
goods desired by English colonists. This created a situation where the Powhatan and the English
were now competing consumers for the same supplies of consumer goods. The only real items
of value that the Powhatan could offer were labor and high-value goods, such as furs and skins.
As of 1646, the latter do not appear to have been exchanged in large quantities between the
English and Powhatan. The fact that almost all of the Indian indentures were children, and that
those who ran away in the future were to be returned per the terms of the treaty indicate that
laboring as an indentured servant for the English was not a desirable condition. The boundary
set by the treaty thus served to contain laborers in Virginia, and possibly to prevent direct access
by the Powhatan to the consumer goods that the colonists increasingly demanded.
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Chapter VI. ANGLO-POWHATAN ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS, 1622-1646
Subjective Value and Shifting Comparative Advantage
Subjective value refers to the fact that different individuals value goods and services at
different levels. In concrete terms, subjective value represents the minimum price that a buyer
would pay for an item. It is a simple concept that has profound implications for economic
exchange – especially across cultures with radically different values-systems. Within the context
of Anglo-Powhatan interaction between 1622 and 1646, the values of particular goods fluctuated
due to the changing socio-political circumstances, as well.130
Comparative advantage refers to the ability of a given party to produce a good or service
at a lower opportunity cost relative to another party. Opportunity cost refers to the next best
alternative that is given up when an individual makes a decision. Practically speaking,
opportunity cost is the minimum price that a seller will accept for a given item. Comparative
advantage is thus relative and changeable depending on the parties involved in any given
exchange and on circumstances. To further complicate matters, subjective value means that
opportunity costs can be calculated in very different terms by different parties in an exchange.
The role of shifting opportunity costs in the production and exchange of particular goods, and
thus shifting comparative advantages associated with each good, provide a useful structure for
evaluating the economic shifts that shaped the terms of the 1646 Anglo-Powhatan treaty.
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Overview of Goods Exchanged
The Powhatan traded copper (both goods and raw), glass and metal beads, and iron tools
prior to the massacre in 1621/2, however, the specific goods that they desired during and at the
end of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War must be inferred, as the records are sparse.
Archaeological digs can offer some clues, though one is forced to generalize about broader
patterns from a sample of sites. It is also probable that the goods that the Powhatan desired
previously were still in demand, with the possible exception of raw copper.131
Prior to the settlement of Jamestown, the Powhatan had an economy that was based on a
combination of agriculture, hunting, and foraging. Powhatan agriculture focused on the
cultivation of maize, squash, and beans, which, while an important source of sustenance, were
heavily supplemented by wild plants and animals. For the chiefs and warriors, there was also a
healthy trade in status goods, including copper, shell beads and ornaments, and puccoon (used
for red dye).132
The arrival of the English in 1607 did not suddenly and drastically alter the Powhatan
economy. Instead, changes occurred piecemeal over time. The most notable English
introductions in terms of utility were metal tools and cloth. The former provided a significant
upgrade in terms of quality over stone tools, the latter over animal skins. Glass beads provided a
substitute for shell and stone beads, which took significant time and effort to produce. The
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English imported significant amounts of copper, which, while not a new good, greatly altered the
value of the metal and seriously undermined the authority of chiefs who had used control of the
precious metal to maintain their political power.133 Firearms and metal weapons were also novel
to and much desired by the Powhatan, though the English were understandably reluctant to trade
these items. The changes that resulted from the introduction of these goods played out in
different ways over extended periods of time.
Copper
Copper occurred naturally in North America and was used for a variety of purposes by
indigenous people before Europeans arrived. In pre-contact societies, the copper supply was
controlled by political and spiritual elites and was used to demonstrate and gain status.134 When
the English arrived at Jamestown, they understood that copper could be a valuable trade good,
though they also probably hoped to utilize copper in the production of brass if they could find
supplies of zinc in North America.135 The latter point is more than trivial as it demonstrates that:
1) the English were genuinely interested in establishing some productive industry beyond simply
extracting resources, and 2) the collapse of the indigenous valuation of copper and the
subsequent fall in political power that accompanied it was a by-product of mutually-acceptable
exchange rather than a deliberate effort by the English to destroy indigenous political structures.
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The major impact of the copper trade was the undermining of chiefly authority in the
Powhatan political structure. Jeffrey Hantmann argued that the Powhatan leaders had previously
obtained copper via trade with the Monacans to the west, and that the arrival of the English
provided an alternative source of the metal with better goods, such as metal tools and cloth, on
offer for exchange. However, within several years of their arrival, English traders managed to
exchange copper through unofficial channels and effectively flooded the market.136 It is
estimated that by about 1620 the value of copper had reached a low point from which it never
really recovered.137
It seems that after about 1620, copper had lost a significant amount of its non-material
power due to its prevalence. Copper still appeared in various contexts, such as ornaments in
burials, and often in trade goods that contained copper-alloy.138 The latter context is consistent
with a scenario wherein the value of copper was largely practical. Further, once copper was
most valued in a largely practical role in making alloy, it would have in many cases been an
inferior substitute for iron tools, further lowering its value.
Once copper was reduced to simply another material good, trade in the metal was no
longer lucrative. Both the English and Powhatan had access to copper, but the flooded market
eliminated opportunities for arbitrage that had initially existed when the Powhatan subjectively
valued copper highly. It is notable that the record of Robert Poole’s 1624 trading expedition
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made no mention of exchanging copper for corn or any other goods. Later in the minutes for the
same day’s session, there is a reference to a seemingly practical copper furnace and coverings. 139
Despite its huge initial importance, by 1646 the copper trade had been a non-factor in AngloPowhatan relations for roughly two decades. To emphasize the dearth of raw copper in Virginia
by the 1640s, in November 1645, the Assembly enacted a statute to provide for the importation
of 10,000 pounds of copper to make into coins.140 This also represented a move toward a
monetary system within Virginia, which would have made access to the colonial economy even
more difficult for the Powhatan.
While copper did not play a role in the terms of the 1646 treaty, it did demonstrate the
influence of trade in altering the local economy. It also served as an example to both the English
and Powhatan authorities of the dangers of unregulated economic exchange to the political
power structures. The economic exchange of copper had dire consequences for Powhatan
political structures, and the subsequent collapse of its value ended the massive arbitrage
opportunities that culturally-driven subjective valuation had initially created. The copper trade
thus illustrated why exchange in goods that had disproportionately significant value for one of
the parties was unsustainable, at least in a largely unregulated market.
To the Powhatan leadership, then, a clear boundary and strict regulation of trade may
have offered hope of restoring authority. By restricting trade with the English, the influx of
goods could be better controlled and wild fluctuations of value avoided. Further, all trade would
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be regulated by Powhatan leaders, potentially restoring their monopoly of high-value status
goods.
Maize
From the beginning of the Jamestown settlement in 1607, the English relied heavily on
the Powhatan for food. However, in the Post-Fort Period after 1624, evidence for a highly
integrated economy largely disappears as domesticated animals became the predominant source
of meat and “exchange relations that had been bilateral became unidirectional.”141 That is, much
of flow of goods was from the Powhatan to the English, especially with the deliberate policy of
raiding Powhatan cornfields during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War. As the previously
discussed statutes through the mid-1630s have shown, Powhatan-grown maize was still a
desirable commodity to the English, but the means of obtaining it often required violence for the
duration of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War.
Some of the orders to facilitate the ongoing conflict with the Powhatan included
admonishments to palisade all dwellings, not to travel or work alone or unarmed, not to waste
shot or powder, to keep weapons in serviceable condition, and for all able colonists to participate
in a coordinated attack on the Powhatan in July 1623/4.142 Despite all this, a preceding order
noted “that all trade for corn with the salvages [savages] as well publick as private after June
next shall be prohibited.”143 What this implies is that trade for corn was occurring, despite the
ongoing war, and that the timing of the prohibition must have been coordinated with the July
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attacks prescribed in the orders. Thus economic exchange and military conflict coexisted
without apparent contradiction.
What is particularly notable about the exchange (mutually agreed, or otherwise) of corn is
that the necessity of this food source gave corn the potential to be a staple of exchange between
the Powhatan and the English. The English were committed to tobacco production, and
frequently had to be induced by their government to plant corn. Further, the English often had to
resort to long-range trading expeditions and violent expropriation via government ordered
attacks to obtain sufficient quantities of corn during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War (16221632). Clearly corn’s value was great, but it never became the basis for a mutually beneficial
Anglo-Powhatan trade partnership.
By the summer of 1634, two years after the end of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War,
Governor John Harvey was able to write “every family hath now corn to spare,” citing the
statutes requiring the planting of corn as the cause of this surplus.144 Harvey also noted that
some of this corn was “for the relief of New England.”145 Harvey did not explain whether the
corn was sent out of charity of if it was traded, but this reference hinted at agricultural exchange
between the two regions. New England ship captain, Thomas Yong, was in the Chesapeake in
1634 for purposes of exploration, and confirmed that a corn trade did exist between Virginia and
New England. Upon encountering a ship in the Chesapeake, his first impression was “we
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thought she had bene some vessal bound from Virginia to New England, whither the Inhabitants
of Virginia drive a great trade for Indian Corne.”146
The county court records for Accomack/Northampton contain a reference to corn bound
for New England in a dispute heard in July 1641.147 In March 1641/2, the records show that
there was an attempt to build a windmill, though it fell through due to the millwright’s death.148
Grain production and processing did expand in Virginia, as by 1649, “there were five watermills…four windmills, and a great number of horse and hand mills.”149 Dutchman David
Pietersz De Vries noted during a 1643 visit that “lands which had been exhausted by tobaccoplanting, were now sown with fine wheat, and some of them with flax.”150
While it easy to account for the failure of the Powhatan to develop their corn production
as a product of ongoing war and the loss of land, another important part of the answer lies in the
gender roles and social structure of Powhatan society. The Powhatan seem to have followed a
pattern of agriculture common among indigenous people in what is now the southeastern United
States. Small family groups operated as both social and economic units, and crops were tended
and stored at both a household and community level.151
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As paramount chief prior to and during the initial English settlement of Virginia,
Powhatan commanded a wide-ranging tribute system that probably encouraged some level of
surplus production in order to fulfill tributary requirements. However, the loss of land and
diminished authority of Powhatan leaders would have made this less possible over time. When
individual groups are considered, the small scale production practices of Powhatan agriculture
were never going to allow for large surpluses from any single group.
Also, Powhatan agriculture was almost exclusively a female activity. As Helen Rountree
has examined, the tasks associated with agricultural production along with the other activities
that Powhatan women had to complete left little time for leisure.152 The economic and social
spheres of Powhatan men and women were largely separate, so while both sexes had
complementary roles, they operated independently.153
This mattered to any potential shifts in corn production because even if Powhatan women
wanted to increase output, they would have been unable to do so without sacrificing other
important tasks. Powhatan men, and especially leaders, who probably reaped more immediate
benefits of the corn trade, were not potential agricultural laborers within the Powhatan social
context, creating a sort of principal-agent problem. While the political power of chiefs was
sufficient to command some tribute, gender roles were not sufficiently hierarchical that
Powhatan men could have simply forced women to produce more.154 Given these social
constraints, there was no way to reallocate resources to increase corn production that did not
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involve substantial non-material opportunity costs, despite the potential economic benefits that
such specialization could have created.
By the time of the 1646 treaty, English Virginia was producing grain surpluses for export.
Given that the Powhatan were able to continue growing their own food, they did not provide an
export market for English grain. Rather, as with cattle, the English in Virginia found markets for
their produce in other English colonies that lacked the ability to produce sufficient quantities of
grain on their own. This further increased economic ties between Virginia and other colonies,
while cutting off another potential source of economic exchange between the English and
Powhatan. The exchange of grain (both willing and coerced) that was so important that it
continued to occur even during the Second Anglo-Powhatan was unnecessary by 1646. The idea
of pursuing agriculture practices that were well-established in cultural traditions was more
appealing to the English and Powhatan than significantly changing these practices in order to
sustain economic exchange, making the formal separation of the two societies a rationale choice
in terms of non-material opportunity costs.
Shell Beads
Shell beads had a long history as indigenous objects of exchange prior to
European contact, so the idea of using these beads as a medium of exchange was not a European
introduction. Evidence for the economic impact of the Virginia colony on indigenous trade
networks is present in the shift in shell bead production and distribution, however. James
Bradley, in his 2011 article, “Re-visiting Wampum and other Seventeenth-Century Shell
Games,” focused on shifts in wampum production in the New England and mid-Atlantic regions,
and especially on the Dutch trade in New Amsterdam. However, Bradley offered some brief
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hints as to the impact of events in Virginia on the larger shell bead economy, noting that until the
early seventeenth century, Chesapeake shell beads were exchanged widely on the east coast.155
Bradley then speculated that observed drops in the quantity of shell beads at Iroquois sites during
the First Anglo-Powhatan War (1609-1614) were potential evidence of a disruption in shell bead
production in the Chesapeake region.156
The period of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War (1622-1632) saw wampum “established
as a medium for cross-cultural exchange in the Northeast,” and also saw production centers of
shell beads established at indigenous sites north of the Chesapeake. This production was spurred
in part by local increases in demand, but the lack of incoming shell beads from the Chesapeake
region would seem to imply that the Chesapeake beads were either not being produced, or that
they were being used in other markets.
Bradley wrote “after the end of the last Powhatan War in 1646, marine shell objects from
the Chesapeake, and farther south, once again begin to occur on Five Nations sites.”157
Changing circumstances to the Northeast of the Chesapeake with regard to relationships between
indigenous peoples and Dutch, French, and English settlers and traders explain some of the shifts
in trade patterns. However, the timing of the reappearance of Chesapeake-produced shell beads
strongly implies that events in Virginia were responsible for this particular shift in 1646. What
remains unclear is whether the Chesapeake shell objects found at Iroquois sites were coming
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directly from trade with the Powhatan and other indigenous groups in the Chesapeake region, or
via European (if so, most likely Dutch) trade in the Chesapeake.
From Bradley’s observations, several important points about the Chesapeake economy
can be inferred. First, production of goods for exchange was well-established among indigenous
people long before the English arrived in the Chesapeake region. Second, indigenous patterns of
production and trade responded to changing circumstances, economic and otherwise. Finally,
the reappearance of Chesapeake-produced shell beads at Iroquois sites at the end of the Third
Anglo-Powhatan War suggests that either the conflict and the resulting treaty, economic changes
prior to the conflict, or both had a significant impact on patterns of trade between the English and
the Powhatan in the Chesapeake.
Contrasted with the lack of change in maize production, the alterations in shell bead
production and exchange are useful in explaining the clear boundary in the 1646 treaty within an
economic context. While maize production was highly dependent on geography, requiring a
long-term commitment to a specific location, bead production was less so. Further, while
producing a surplus of maize for trade would have required some drastic restructuring of
Powhatan social norms, changing patterns of bead production would have been, at most, mildly
disruptive. The Powhatan probably deemed the cultural opportunity costs of altering maize
production to maintain economic ties with the English too great, while reverting to production of
beads would have represented a shift away from English influence and produced a good that was
readily tradable with any other indigenous people.158 Bead production also appears to have been
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performed by both men and women, so there was greater flexibility in this field as opposed to
agriculture.159 By agreeing to the boundary and restrictions in the treaty, the Powhatan were able
to maintain cultural practices and limit external influences.
Glass Beads
The glass beads that the English and other Europeans brought to North America were not
a new item to indigenous people. As discussed above, bead production was a well-establish
indigenous industry. The glass beads simply offered a substitute to shell or stone beads. The
appeal of the glass beads was a combination of spiritual association with particular colorations
and the fact that producing shell beads was a time and labor intensive task.160 The decision to
trade for glass beads was somewhat similar to the decision by the Powhatan to trade for copper
in that the good’s value was largely driven by culturally-based subjective valuation.
From a Powhatan perspective, the glass beads that the English so readily traded
represented an attractive substitute for indigenous shell beads. To the English, the beads were
really only valuable as an item of exchange. As was the case with copper, the vastly different
subjective valuations of these beads led to minimal opportunity costs for both parties when these
beads were exchanged. While the connections between copper and elite status in Powhatan
society were well-established, it is less clear to what extent beads may have represented a status
good. The value of glass beads, at least in the early exchanges between the English and
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Powhatan, came from the associations between particular colors and Powhatan spiritual
beliefs.161
Excavations of Jamestown and surrounding sites have yielded results that suggest a
change in the pattern of bead-types exchanged around the 1624 cut-off between the Fort Period
and the Post-Fort Period. From 1624 on, archaeologists found an increase in beads of the
robin’s-egg blue, round white, and gooseberry type and a drop in nueva cadiz-type beads of blue
and turquoise as well as cone-shaped yellow beads. Other types of beads more strongly
associated with sixteenth-century sites disappear from the Post-Fort assemblage entirely.162
Whether these shifts represented a change on the demand or the supply side is less clear.
In the article summarizing these findings, Heather Lapham discussed the evidence for the earlier
beads most likely coming from Venetian suppliers, but also noted that glass bead production had
started in the Netherlands by the late sixteenth-century.163 While there is clear evidence that the
Jamestown colony attempted glassmaking around 1608 and again in the early 1620s, it is not
clear how long this venture lasted, nor the quantity or quality of the products.164 While the
success of a local glassmaking industry could plausibly explain a shift in the types of beads
produced, so too could economic shifts in the European glass industry. If the change did
represent a shift on the supply side, it is not clear whether the drivers of this were local or global.

161

See Gallivan, et al, 27 for an overview of the likely color associations.
Heather Lapham, “More Than ‘A Few Blew Beads’: The Glass and Stone Beads from Jamestown Rediscovery’s
1994-1997 Excavations,” The Journal of the Jamestown Rediscovery Center 1 (2001).
163
Ibid.
164
For full discussion, see Charles E. Hatch, Jr., “Glassmaking in Virginia, 1607-1625,” The William and Mary
Quarterly 21 (1941): 227-238.
162

83
On the demand side, the Powhatan were particularly interested in blue beads, which
“likely figured into Powhatan color symbolism as a color akin to black.”165 These blue beads
appear in abundance in the Fort Period (pre-1624), but effectively disappear after this.166 It is not
clear whether this was due to a reduction of trade after the 1621/2 massacre, or whether it
reflected changing preferences on the part of the Powhatan or other tribes with whom they
traded. There is also evidence that beads simply became less prominent in the Post-Fort Period
more generally.167 The reduction in the quantity of beads found, regardless of the cause,
indicates a lower volume of bead trade, which, given the English valued beads for little else
besides trade, is consistent with diminished Anglo-Powhatan exchange.
One possible explanation that would connect the 1621/2 massacre and the shift in bead
assemblages is that the English were forced to look beyond the Powhatan for trade in corn after
the massacre and subsequent English retaliation soured relations. In December 1624, there was a
record of a Robert Poole who had returned from a trading expedition where he had traded twenty
three “armes length of some beads” for two “tubbs of Corne.”168 Poole did not specify the type
of beads he traded here, but later in his testimony, he explicitly mentioned blue beads that
another captain had traded for other goods.
There is no way to be certain, but it is possible that the blue beads to which Poole
referred were of the robin’s egg blue variety that increased in prominence during the Post-Fort
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Period (1624 on), and not the nueva cadiz blue beads so uniquely popular with the Powhatan
during the Fort Period. Given that the English expeditions were trading with indigenous groups
beyond the Powhatan chiefdom,169 the robin’s egg blue bead (which were probably closer to
turquoise in color due to the copper used as a colorant) would have been recognized and
accepted as a tradable good, irrespectively of any specific spiritual association. Lapham pointed
out that these beads “have been found in archaeological contexts from the late 16th- through the
middle 17th-centuries, from as far north as Ontario, Canada, to as far south as Florida.”170 The
increased presence of these robin’s egg blue beads very likely indicated that they had become a
medium of exchange on the Eastern seaboard. The value of these beads came from their ability
to serve as a form of money.
Ultimately, the bead trade did not drastically alter Anglo-Powhatan economic relations.
However, the beads – both glass and shell - do provide an example of a substitution. That is,
when glass beads were readily available via trade with the English in the Chesapeake, shell beads
from this region are less prominent. With the reduction of Anglo-Powhatan trade, Chesapeakeproduced shell beads reappeared. What this demonstrates is that, in this context, the Powhatan
opted to pursue their comparative advantage, which, so long as they were actively trading with
the English, was not in bead-making. The reappearance of Chesapeake shell beads in northern
contexts right around 1646 strongly suggests that the Powhatan supply of European-made glass
substitutes had dried up. If the Powhatan valued their political and territorial integrity highly and
recognized that replacing glass beads with shell beads was a relatively simple substitution that
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actually reinforced cultural integrity by refocusing effort and resources on production of a precontact item, then the terms of treaty can again seem to represent an economic and political
calculation on the part of the Powhatan.
Furs and Skins
In article one of the 1646 treaty, it is stipulated that “Necotowance and his successors are
to pay unto the King’s Govern’r. the number of twenty beaver skins att the goieing away of
Geese yearely.”171 It is significant that this is the only material tribute required in the treaty
because it represents merely a nominal sum paid in a commodity that the English were not
actively seeking prior to the agreement. If the English had sought to use the treaty as a means to
economically exploit the Powhatan, the terms would have called for significantly greater tribute,
and would have sought something with more immediate value.
The most likely source of profitable trade based on extracting natural resources would
have been deerskins. Deer were much utilized by the Powhatan and appear frequently in the
historical and archaeological records.172 Later in the seventeenth century, the deerskin trade was
a source of great profit in the southern colonies and did lead to greatly altered behavior on the
part of Indian hunters.173 However, the idea of exporting them in large quantities for profit did
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not seem to be a priority at the time of the treaty. In February 1631/2, the Assembly passed a
statute prohibiting the export of any hides or skins from Virginia.174
This did not preclude a deerskin trade within Virginia, and evidence suggests that such
trade did take place fairly early. Robert Poole’s 1624 expedition traded for corn and also
obtained several animal skins, obtaining a total of nine bear, six deer, two wildcat, twenty-nine
muskrats, and one [presumably mountain] lion. It also made a point of saying that they did not
obtain any black fox skins, though why these were of importance is not explained.175 However,
this expedition was far north of Powhatan influence in the region of the Patuxent River. It is also
notable that the skins were not the primary object of the expedition, and what it did obtain was
not anywhere near enough to form the base for a profitable enterprise. References in the statutes
to hiring Indians as guides and hunters, and a direct reference to a dispute involving deerskins in
Accomack/Northampton County also attest to a small scale localized trade.176
Another reference from later the same year mentions that while it was illegal to kill wild
swine, “it is thought convenient that any man be permitted to kill deare or other wild beasts or
fowle…that thereby the inhabitants may be trained in the use of theire armes.”177 Deer were
seemingly more valued for target practice and a source of meat than as an exploitable and
exportable commodity.178 The prohibition on exporting hides was again listed in the November
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1645 statutes, and finally lifted in March 1645/6.179 While the statute is not specific regarding
types of animals, it appears to have been a blanket restriction on the export of any animal
skins.180
Beaver pelts did have the potential to form the basis of a profitable colonial industry in
Virginia, as was the case in other regions of North America. Henry Fleet was one of the first
Virginians to seriously pursue the beaver trade in the Chesapeake, but his lackluster returns, his
1632 arrest for trading without a license, and his failure to connect with the right power brokers
hampered his career. Fleet did reappear in the record, trading under license from the newly
established Maryland colony in 1637 and managing to obtain thirty beaver skins for his
efforts.181
That one trading voyage in the northern Chesapeake could obtain half again as many
beaver pelts as the Virginians demanded in tribute yearly implies that either the English were not
in a terribly strong bargaining position, that there just were not many high quality beaver in the
Powhatan domain, or that traders who stood benefit from the restricted trade with Powhatan
wanted to ensure that there would be plenty of pelts for which to trade. Given that no traders
appear to have seriously attempted to establish a fur trade directly with the Powhatan, the latter
possibility seems unlikely. The treaty article was more likely influenced by a combination of the
first two factors.
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William Claiborne received a royal license to trade in May 1631, presumably allowing
him and his business partners to preempt the local ban on export of hides that occurred the next
year. Like Fleet and other small time traders before him, Claiborne’s ambitious trading venture
was not with the Powhatan, but with the Susquehannock on the northern end of the Chesapeake.
Claiborne’s plan was to utilize the Chesapeake as an outlet for furs from locations farther north
and thus undercut the French trade in Canada. His plan was then to ship the pelts to London and
also to make a profit shipping corn and tobacco to New England.182
Kent Island in the northern Chesapeake was Claiborne’s base of operations, and he
established what he hoped would be a self-sustaining colony there in 1631. The operation
managed to survive until February 1637/8, when Claiborne’s quarrel with the new colony of
Maryland over access to the beaver trade became violent and made his position untenable.
Claiborne and his associates also made sure that his Maryland competitors never established a
large scale trade, either, effectively ending the potential for a Virginia-dominated Chesapeake
beaver trade barely a decade after it began.183
Two factors besides the conflict with the fledging Maryland colony also contributed to
Claiborne’s failure. First, Claiborne’s London-based partners did not send him nearly enough
trade goods (he specifically mentioned Dutch duffels and Spanish axes), which meant that he
was unable to obtain the full supply of pelts that the Susquehannock had on offer. To try to
make up the shortfall, Claiborne attempted to purchase more of the tools desired by the
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Susquehannock in Virginia, but the prices there were prohibitively high due to the relative
scarcity of these goods in the colony.184
Second, even though Claiborne was able to obtain huge amounts of pelts in a relatively
short time – 7,500 pounds between 1631 and 1638 – he was not able to turn a profit. His venture
ended up about £2,500 in the red.185 Two later references to beaver pelts as payment of debt
appear in the 1643 court records for Accomack/Northampton County. In one case, the amount is
twenty pounds, in the other, ten pounds. In the former, the debtor had been part of Claiborne’s
Kent Island venture.186 While beaver pelts were clearly still traded, the volume was too low to
constitute the basis for a large-scale export industry, and those pelts that did come out of Virginia
were not coming from the Powhatan.
In 1651, the Accomack/Northampton County court outlawed fur trading by the Dutch
(probably in conjunction with the Navigation Acts), which does suggest that there was some fur
trading still occurring on the northeastern fringe of Virginia.187 Several individuals did continue
to trade successfully for furs after the collapse of Claiborne’s Kent Island venture, but again this
trade occurred outside the realm of Anglo-Powhatan relations.
These problems are instructive with regard to the potential for any fur trade with the
Powhatan. Claiborne was able to obtain 7,500 pounds of beaver pelts in roughly seven years and
he could not sustain his business. The twenty pelts that Virginia obtained via tribute each year
were not going to greatly enrich anyone and probably indicated that there were simply not a lot
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of beavers whose pelts were worth taking in Powhatan territory. Also, the scarcity of trade
goods in Virginia that hampered Claiborne’s venture would have also meant that in the 1630s,
Virginia had little to spare in the way of tools and other practical items for which the Powhatan
would have been willing to trade.
With regard to the treaty, the beaver skins required as tribute were probably as much
symbolic as material, and while the deerskin trade would later be a source of profit, it is not clear
that the English recognized its full potential by 1646. While furs and skins were valuable,
forming the economic basis of many colonial ventures, they do not appear to have been a
significant driver of Anglo-Powhatan exchange in 1640s Virginia. This scenario is consistent
with the treaty restrictions that, de facto, made only high-value goods worthwhile to exchange.
That is, furs and skins were still valuable, but the volume of this exchange was too low to justify
maintaining a high level of Anglo-Powhatan economic integration in 1646. The treaty would
thus have not stymied this particular trade, and probably facilitated it by concentrating any trade
that did occur at the two prescribed forts.
Cloth and Tools
As Claiborne’s complaints about his London partners showed, the Indians with whom the
fur traders dealt desired specific goods, in this case duffels and axes. During Fleet’s 1637 trip,
despite carrying a wide array of trade goods, he was only able to barter cloth.188 It does seem
that cloth was the most desirable commodity that the English could offer, which makes sense
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given that the Indians had no comparable material and no means of producing a viable substitute
that would be as lightweight and easy to work.
It is notable that the Assembly restricted trade of cloth in 1633 because there was concern
that the English colonists were unable to obtain sufficient quantities. The act began:
WHEREAS there hath beene great quantities of cloath, bayes [baize], and cotton, bought
upp out of the stores of this colony, by such as have traded the same with the Indians, at
such tyme when as the inhabitants have beene in great want and neede. Now although all
trade with the natives is to be cherished for many respects, yett it is thought fitt that the
necessitie of our present want, be first to be supplyed.189
The statement that “all trade with the natives is to be cherished for many respects” is a curious
qualification. It is not clear why this clause was inserted, other than to perhaps assuage any fears
among traders that this act could bring greater restrictions on trade. The act certainly implied
that the previous wartime prohibitions on trading with the Indians were no longer in effect.
Although the act previous to this one did explicitly ban trading any “gunns, powder, shott, or any
armes or ammunition unto any Indian,” no other restrictions appear in the 1633 records.190 The
act continued:
And therefore it is ordered, That no person or persons, doe trade or trucke any such
cloath, cotton or bayes, unto any Indians which is or shall be brought into this colony, as
marchandize intended to be sould to the planters here, upon penaltie and forfeiture of
double the value of such cloath, cotton or bayes, as any such person or persons shall trade
or trucke unlesse the Governor uppon veiwe taken in the stores that there is such cloath,
cotton or bayes doe give leave and lycense to trade and trucke such cloaths, cotton or
bayes to the Indians.191
The move toward official government oversight per the necessity of obtaining license from the
governor represented a shift toward tighter controls of colonial jurisdiction. This precedent was
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important to the 1646 treaty, which specified that only the colonial government was allowed to
license traders coming or going from Virginia.
The fact that such items as cloth, baize, and cotton were being traded with the Indians
when there were English colonists in need of them would strongly suggest that the Indians were
able to offer better prices for the goods. This meant that considerations of racial solidarity with
regard to resource distribution were trumped by market considerations, at least in this particular
case. Unfortunately, what these traders received in exchange for this cloth is not recorded.
Although it is clear that some cloth was being traded with groups other than the Powhatan, the
proximity of the Powhatan to the majority of Virginians and the fact that this statute appeared so
soon after the end of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War make it plausible that at least some of this
cloth was being traded with them.
This episode could foreshadow one reason for restricted trade in the 1646 treaty. English
traders who sought out the best price for their wares could leave English consumers wanting.
Traders were driven by their own profits, while the governmental authorities in Virginia stood to
gain financially from regulating trade, they also had political and military issues to consider. Per
the Assembly’s choice of language in the statute, the fact the some were trading cloth with
Indians when English consumer were in need of it looked bad. Licensing traders dealt with this
problem by allowing the colonial government to control the supply and type of goods that
entered and left the Virginia economy.
The treaty restrictions would thus have not been onerous to traders who were working
under government license already. Nor would it have drastically altered the availability of cloth
to Powhatan consumers, who were probably dealing with these traders prior to the treaty,
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anyway. Cloth thus represented a high value good, the trade pattern of which was already in line
with what the treaty terms made viable.
Indians also desired metal tools, and the records of traders frequently show items such as
hoes, axes, and knives.192 Like cloth, metal tools offered a vastly superior substitute for
indigenous goods. These items were both functional and familiar to indigenous traders, as these
tools existed in indigenous cultures simply in more rudimentary and less efficient forms. To
swap out a stone knife or axe for one made of iron was not a difficult choice, nor did it
undermine any sense of cultural continuity in the way that integrating oneself into English
society would have. It was not the act of trading for a good, but rather the impacts of adopting a
particular good that drove indigenous decisions about what was worth trading for.
However, as previously discussed, by 1646 the English and Powhatan were competing
consumers for many of the same imported goods. Again, this situation favored traders who
could take advantage of economic and political connections. To trade tools that were valuable to
English consumers instead to the Powhatan meant that the good obtained in exchange had to be
even more valuable than what Virginia’s residents could offer. This was much more likely for a
trader taking advantage of bulk purchase, storage, and transport to lower the costs of supplying
these items. The market for these goods consisted of both English and Powhatan consumers,
which probably drove their value higher at the same time that traders could supply them more
cheaply. The benefits of regulated trade to established traders were clear and, as with cloth, the
pattern of exchange would have already followed what the treaty encouraged. The impacts on
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the consumers, both English and Powhatan, were likely negligible, while the other terms of the
treaty provided them peace of mind.
Firearms
The 1646 treaty included a provision that the Powhatan relinquish any guns in their
possession to the English.193 How this would be enforced was not explained. Like many of the
consumer goods available to seventeenth-century consumers, firearms were desirable to both the
English and the Powhatan. However, technological constraints prevented American Indians
from producing gunpowder weapons. Further, a history of violence meant that many English
were constantly fearful of anything that might give the Powhatan a military advantage. The
frequent reiterations in the Virginia colonial statutes banning both the actual trade in firearms,
ammunition, and gunpowder and the offering of instruction in the use thereof attest to this fear.
In March 1642/3, the Assembly again addressed the matter of providing weapons to
Indians, making it a crime punishable by death for runaway servants to carry weapons to the
Indians. The Assembly further commented on the practice among some colonists of furnishing
Indians with guns to hunt deer and other game, which endangered the colony by providing both
firearms, and the knowledge of their effective use, to said Indians.194 Though the efficacy of the
idea was questionable, authorities in Virginia most likely saw the border as another means of
restricting the flow of weapons to the Powhatan.
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The Powhatan had reasons, both military and otherwise, for desiring firearms and the
only way to obtain them was via exchange with the English, or through intermediaries who could
obtain weapons from other Europeans further north.195 Collectively, the English had little reason
beyond economic profit to trade in firearms, and the potential marginal gains to the colony from
such a trade were far outweighed by the potential costs of another massacre. However, for an
enterprising individual who had access to firearms and to interested Powhatan buyers, such
collective considerations were of little importance. In fact, the prohibitions on trading weapons
would have increased their value by effectively inducing constant artificial shortages.
The fact that the Powhatan did obtain firearms despite the statutory prohibition designed
to prevent this means that the prohibitions were not wholly effective. By 1659, the Assembly
abandoned the prohibitions, noting that the Indians were getting weapons anyway and that
Virginians might as well profit from trading guns, too.196 Probably because they would be
terribly incriminating, there are not any explicit records of English traders selling firearms to the
Powhatan. However, it seems probable given the regulatory environment that firearms and the
requisite accoutrements operated as black market goods. If this was the case, the treaty terms,
while nominally addressing concerns regarding the exchange of weapons, would have done little
to tangibly impact the firearm trade. The treaty allowed both sides to publicly agree to the
politically acceptable position, while never seriously threatening the economic reality.
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Chapter VII: CONCLUSION
Prior to 1622, it appeared that the Anglo-Powhatan economy was highly integrated,
especially in that the English were heavily reliant on the Powhatan for food. With the massacre
that began the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, trust between the two groups was shaken.
However, though interactions diminished, there was still a fair degree of cross-cultural exchange.
In 1644, another massacre of English colonists began the Third Anglo-Powhatan War. By the
end of this conflict two years later, both sides saw fit to establish a clear boundary and to greatly
restrict economic interactions.
While the wars were impactful events that caused mutual suspicion, damaged
infrastructure, and depleted populations, they were not the ultimate cause of the 1646 boundary.
Instead, economic developments in Virginia, only partly driven by the conflicts, made the
boundary and restrictions of 1646 attractive to both sides.
From an economic perspective, the supply of labor in Virginia was never able to meet the
demand. Incoming workers were either already attached to a planter via indenture, or were
quickly assigned one. The opportunity costs of putting an unskilled worker to uses other than
tobacco production or essential tasks were high due to the lost time in training and the fact that
there was little other profitable means of employing this labor. The labor market in Virginia was
thus in a constant state of shortage, drawing ever more unskilled workers to the colony.
This imbalance continued to draw more people to Virginia, but as much of this new labor
was put to work in the expanding tobacco industry, the economy of Virginia made little progress
toward diversification. Instead, a specialized tobacco-focused economy simply grew larger in
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scale. While the increased population and matters of necessity did ultimately lead to higher
levels of grain production, this only worked to disintegrate the Anglo-Powhatan economy, as the
Powhatan role as food suppliers was rendered unnecessary.
Efforts at diversification, while having limited impact, did shape the views of the
Virginia administration under William Berkeley. The increased trade with other English
colonies and the Netherlands pulled Virginia into the larger Atlantic economy. Further, if the
pattern of diminishing local production of consumer goods in Virginia is more broadly
applicable, the fact that pipe-making only continued in indigenous contexts is particularly telling.
As local production of consumer goods in Virginia decreased, Virginians increasingly relied on
imports from Europe, which could be traded for tobacco. In order for Virginians to make
profitable exchanges with the Powhatan, they had to find trade goods, such as high-quality furs,
that were more valuable than the commodities desired by the Powhatan.
The restrictions on trading and crossing the new boundary meant that only those who
were politically connected could obtain permission to trade. This was probably a moot point,
though, since only those wealthy enough to take advantage of economies of scale in purchasing
and transporting trade goods could make it profitable, and anyone wealthy enough to do so was
already politically connected.
For the Powhatan, the commodities that they still desired by 1646, such as cloth and iron
tools, were not necessities, but rather more durable and effective substitutes for things that they
already possessed. Further, the Powhatan polity suffered a significant blow with the death of
Opechancanough in 1646 and would have been looking for a means to consolidate and reaffirm
its authority. Thus, from the Powhatan perspective, a clearly defined boundary would end the
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conflict, and potentially reinforce the political authority of the new chief, Necotowance, through
the successful negotiation of the treaty. The assistance of the English government in maintaining
the established boundary, and the withdrawal (though probably incomplete) of livestock from
north of the York, also provided the very attractive prospect of limited English encroachment on
Powhatan land. The restrictions on trade were not onerous, since by this time, only high-value
goods were desirable trade items and these paled in value compared to preserving territorial,
cultural, and political integrity.
Ultimately, the terms of the 1646 eroded, English settlement continued to expand, and
what was left of the Powhatan polity dwindled.197 Just several years after the treaty, English
colonists were settling north of the York River and by 1650, tribal chiefs were required to
petition the colonial government for patents to their own land.198 As noted previously, some
tribes did begin to adopt livestock in the 1650s, and the Virginia government abandoned its
efforts to restrict trade in firearms.199 Throughout the several decades following the treaty, many
indigenous leaders had to deal with the Virginia legal system, defending claims to land,
answering charges of livestock theft, and reassuring the colony that they had nothing to do with
any hostile actions taken by non-Powhatans.200 In March 1655/6, the Assembly forbade the sale
of any Powhatan land to individual Englishmen without the Assembly’s approval, thus
effectively declaring itself the guarantor of Powhatan property rights.201
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While the 1646 treaty did provide some protections to the Powhatan in terms of property
and cultural integrity, the unforeseen costs were much greater entanglement in the colonial
judicial system. In order to maintain the guarantees of property rights and freedom from English
encroachment, the Powhatan’s only defense was to call on the government of Virginia to enforce
their agreement. The danger to the Powhatan was that accepting Virginia’s authority on matters
of property rights could be seen as tacit agreement to other elements of colonial authority, as
well. For the Powhatan, the cost of maintaining cultural and territorial integrity was the loss of
political autonomy.
One could read these post-treaty developments cynically and argue that they
demonstrated that the colonial government never intended to uphold the terms; that the treaty
was merely a convenience until the colony was in position to gain from breaking it. However,
the legal entanglements that arose from the treaty were more likely the result of an honest
attempt by the Virginia colony to maintain the terms of the treaty. Through modern eyes, the
land patents for which the chiefs applied look suspiciously like the beginnings of the reservation
system (which in hindsight, they were). At the time, granting these patents was the best method
of which the colonial government could conceive to acknowledge and protect Powhatan property
rights. Further, this approach probably was the best way for Powhatan tribes to maintain some
semblance of cultural integrity as it allowed space (albeit limited) to continue those traditional
practices that they chose to maintain. It is unlikely that either side could have predicted these
developments when they agreed to the treaty. Rather, these post-treaty developments provide
further examples of the continually changing nature of cross-cultural interactions in colonial
Virginia.
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Appendix
Text of 1646 Treaty
Source: William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of

Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619 (New York: R. & W. & G.
Bartow, 1823), Vol. I, 323-326.
Art. 1. BE it enacted by this Grand Assembly, That the articles of peace foll: between the inhabitants of this
collony, and Necotowance King of the Indians bee duely & inviolably observed upon the penaltie within
mentioned as followeth:
Imp. That Necotowance do acknowledge to hold his kingdome from the King's Ma'tie of England, and that
his successors be appointed or confirmed by the King's Governours from time to time, And on the other
side, This Assembly on the behalfe of the collony, doth, undertake to protect him or them against any rebells
or other enemies whatsoever, and as an acknowledgment and tribute for such protection, the said
Necotowance and his successors are to pay unto the King's Govern'r. the number of twenty beaver skins att
the goeing away of Geese yearely.
Art. 2. That it shall be free for the said Necotowance and his people, to inhabit and hunt on the north— page 324 —
side of Yorke River, without any interruption from the English. Provided that if hereafter, it shall be thought
fitt by the Governor and Council to permitt any English to inhabitt from Poropotanke downewards, that
first Necotowance be acquainted therewith.
Art. 3. That Necotowance and his people leave free that tract of land betweene Yorke river and James river,
from the falls of both the rivers to Kequotan, to the English to inhabitt on, and that neither he the said
Necotowance nor any Indians do repaire to or make any abode upon the said tract of land, upon paine of
death, and it shall be lawfull for any person to kill any such Indian, And in case any such Indian or Indians
being seen upon the said tract of land shall make an escape, That the said Necotowance shall uppon demand
deliver the said Indian or Indians to the Englishmen, upon knowledge had of him or them, unles such Indian
or Indians be sent upon a message from the said Necotowance.
And to the intent to avoid all injury to such a messenger, and that no ignorance may be pretended to such
as shall offer any outrage, It is thought fitt and hereby enacted, That the badge worne by a messenger, or,
in case there shall be more than one, by one of the company, be a coate of striped stuffe which is to be left
by the messenger from time to time so often as he shall returne at the places appointed for coming in.
Art. 4. And it is further enacted, That in case any English shall repaire contrary to the articles agreed upon,
to the said north side of Yorke river, such persons soe offending, being lawfully convicted, be adjudged as
felons; Provided that this article shall not extend to such persons who by stresse of weather are forced upon
the said land, Provided alsoe and it is agreed by the said Necotowance, that it may be lawfull for any
Englishman to goe over to the said north side haveing occasion to fall timber trees or cut sedge, soe as the
said persons have warr't for theyre soe doeing under the hand of the Gov. Provided alsoe notwitstandinge
any thing in this act to the contrary, That it shall bee free and lawfull for any English whatsoever between
this present day and the first of March next to kill and bring away what cattle or hoggs that they can by any
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— page 325 —
meanes kill or take upon the said north side of the said river.
Art. 5. And it is further enacted that neither for the said Necotowance nor any of his people, do frequent
come in to hunt or make any abode nearer the English plantations then the lymits of Yapin the black water,
and from the head of the black water upon a straite line to the old Monakin Towne, upon such paine and
penaltie as aforesaid.
Art. 6. And it is further ordered enacted that if any English do entertain any Indian or Indians or doe conceale
any Indian or Indians that shall come within the said limits, such persons being lawfully convicted thereof
shall suffer death as in case of felony, without benefit of clergy, excepted such as shall be authorized thereto
by vertue of this act.
Art. 7. And it is further enacted that the said Necotowance and his people upon all occasions of message to
the Gov'r. for trade, doe repaire unto the ffort Royall onely on the north side, at which place they are to
receive the aforesaid badges, which shall shew them to be messengers, and therefore to be freed from all
injury in their passage to the Governor, upon payne of death to any person or persons whatsoever that shall
kill them, the badge being worn by one of the company, And in case of any other affront, the offence to be
punished according to the quality thereof, and the trade admitted as aforesaid to the said Necotowance and
his people with the commander of the said ffort onely on the north side.
Art. 8. And it is further thought fitt and enacted, that upon any occasion of message to the Gov'r. or trade,
The said Necotowance and his people the Indians doe repair to fforte Henery alias Appamattucke fforte, or
to the house of Capt. John ffloud, and to no other place or places of the south side of the river, att which
places the aforesayd badges of striped stuff are to be and remaine.
Art. 9. And it is further thought fitt and enacted, That Necotowance doe with all convenience bring in the
English prisoners, And all such negroes and guns which are yet remaining either in the possession of
— page 326 —
himselfe or any Indians, and that here deliver upon demand such Indian servants as have been taken
prisoners and shall hereafter run away, In case such Indian or Indians shall be found within the limitts of
his dominions; provided that such Indian or Indians be under the age of twelve years at theire running away.
Art. 10. and it is further enacted & consented, That such Indian children as shall or will freely and
voluntarily come in and live with the English, may remain without breach of the articles of peace provided
they be not above twelve yeares old.
Art. 11. And it is further thought fitt and enacted That the several commanders of the fforts and places as
aforesaid unto which the said Indians as aforesaid are admitted to repaire, In case of trade or Message doe
forthwith provide the said coats in manner striped as aforesaid.

